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Thousands killed in the land of a thousand islands 
It is more than a year since violence erupted in Maluku, the islands stretching from the Philippines to 
Australia. Apart from a short intermezzo in the middle of the year, brutality has continued unabated. 
While in the first half of 1999 the unrest was limited to certain parts of the archipelago, it has since 
August spread to practically the whole region. 
The latest outbreak of violence is even worst than the 
earlier conflict and is now threatening to spill over to other 
parts of the Republic. Arguably the Maluku tragedy has 
become Indonesia's biggest political headache and doom-
sayers are already predicting that unless the violence in 
Maluku is halted it will spread like a prairie-fire, destroying 
the unity of Indonesia and shattering the prospects for de-
mocracy under President Abdurrahman Wahid. 
The death toll is enormous. Some sources say at least 
4,000 people have died over the last 12 months with thou-
sands more wounded. The military no longer giv~s its own 
figures but both Muslim and Christian sources claim that 
more than 3,000 people have been killed in North Maluku 
since Christmas. Tens of thousands have fled, sometimes 
outside Maluku; an estimate of 276,000 people have become 
internally displaced. Areas like North Sulawesi now harbour 
at least 13,000 refugees from North Maluku. 
The first wave of conflict died down in May last year, 
but in August violence erupted again in different places. [see 
also TAPOL Bulletin No. 151, March 1999 and No. 152, 
May 1999]. At its peak, following the events in Ambon city 
the day after Christmas, things became very gruesome in the 
largest two islands, Halmahera and Seram, which were 
struck down by conflicts that left hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands, of people dead. While human rights campaigners try 
to avoid calling this an inter-religious conflict, the reality on 
the ground shows that there is a virtual state of war between 
Christians and Muslims. Until late 1998 Maluku was re-
garded by most people as a place of religious tolerance and 
harmony. But now that Maluku is in flames, foreign analysts 
are comparing the situation in the central island of Ambon to 
Belfast or Beirut, only worse. 
Escalation of the conflict 
While in the first wave of violence mostly hand made 
weapons and machetes were used, in the present wave in-
creasingly automatic assault rifles, grenades and self made 
bombs are being utilised. Doctors say that they have to deal 
with injuries only seen in a full-scale war. Locals use the 
term: perang or war to describe the events . 
While one year ago the battles were fought with knives 
and bows and arrows, the wounded now show injuries in-
flicted by bullets and shrapnel. Both sides possess modem 
weapons, raising the question of where these weapons are 
coming from. It is widely accepted that elements in the army 
are deliberately fuelling the conflict and what better way to 
do that than to distribute weapons to both sides. 
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SOCIAL UNREST 
As was the case in January last year, the latest round of 
bloodshed was triggered by a small traffic incident in De-
cember when a Christian driver ran over a Muslim child. 
This led to an angry mob torching Silo Church, the main 
~~testant church in the centre of Ambon, triggering lethal 
mc1dents farther north, in Halmahera, Seram, Burn, Ternate 
and Tidore. 
The two religious festivities of Christmas and Idul Fitri ~suall~ exude peace and fraternity but this year, they on!; 
mtens1fied the vicious circle of hatred, violence and re-
venge. Traditional and religious leaders are losing a grip 
over the divided communities. A climate has been created 
where the voice of moderation is suspect. 
Emergency situation 
Following the events after Christmas Day, the army an-
nounced that it had taken over security from the police. A 
special command KODAL, Komando Pengendalian Kea-
manan, Command to Control Security, has been established 
and fifteen additional battalions, around 12,000 men, have 
been despatched to Maluku. Eight have been stationed in 
~bon ~d seven in the other islands. On top of this, special 
airborne infantry units have been flown in. Ambon city is so 
devastated that it looks as if it had been invaded by a foreign 
army. 
On 19 January Brig-General Max Tamaela, the com-
mander ?~ the . Pattimura. military command, the highest 
placed mi~itary m the temtory, announced a shoot-on-sight 
order agamst anyone attempting to incite unrest. He also 
announced 23 January as the deadline for civilians to sur-
render guns, including home made rifles. 
are obliged to help each other. The Muslims help to build 
and maintain churches and vice versa. 
Rapid globalisation and the flow of migrants from one 
part of Indonesia to the other has transformed this cosy pic-
ture of Halmahera. Outsiders have arrived to make a fast 
buck. A volcanic eruption in Makian island forced the 
population there, mostly Muslims, to move to North Halma-
hera. This transformed the religious map of the region. Pre-
viously, the northern part of Halmahera was predominantly 
Christian but with the arrival of 10,000 Makians, the de-
mography of the region changed drastically and tensions 
grew, with Christians and Muslims joining in their antipathy 
towards the newcomers. Two years ago the Makian reset-
tlement became a separate administrative sub-district much 
to the dismay of the local people. A local gold mine which 
had previously been in the land of the Kao people was sud-
denly in Makian land. Violence erupted and the Makians 
were forced to flee to Ternate. In retaliation Christians in 
Ternate were driven out by the Muslims. 
Added to these horizontal conflicts is a vertical conflict 
ignited by the battle over the governor-ship of the ne~ 
:province o~ North Maluku, with the Sultan of Ternate play-
mg a crucial role. The explosion of violence in Ambon in 
particular the burning of the Silo Church, triggered 'the 
eruption of violence in Halmahera. 
The killings in Halmahera stirred up emotions among 
Muslims all over Indonesia. A huge rally of around 100 000 
people was organised in Jakarta in early January, addre~sed 
by many senior politicians including Hamzah Haz until 
recently a minister in President Wahid' s cabinet and A.mien 
Rais who chairs the MPR, the supreme legislati~e assembly. 
The demonstrators demanded swift action by the govern-
ment and called for Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri 
to be sacked (because she has been charged to handle the 
Maluku crisis). Some in the huge crowd also called for Ji-
had or '~oly war'. L~ter in the month the predictable hap-
pened with the explosion of violence on the island of Lom-
Although officially the government in Jakarta has re-
fused to declare martial law in Maluku, in effect it has al-
ready been imposed. Ambon now has a curfew from 1 Opm, 
though few people would want to leave their 
houses anyway. A cordon of frigates and lir"F"'"~r....,,,~--..c,,...,."'"'"""-----------,.,....,...... 
patrol boats is now in place in the waters, to 
prevent ships filled with hot-headed people 
arriving from other parts of Indonesia to 
take part in the conflict. While these meas- • 
ures may have helped to halt the violence 
temporarily, none of the basic problems has 
been resolved. A large military presence 
cannot resolve the conflict in Maluku, The 
roots of the problems must be tackled. 
The Halmahera tragedy 
The violence in Halmahera has been ex-
plained properly by some social scientists 
reflecting the horizontal and vertical con~ 
flicts valid for the whole of Maluku. As in 
Ambon, the Halmahera population is di-
vided into Muslim and Christian communi-
ties. The religious divide goes down to the 
grassroots level, where many families in-
clude adherents of Islam as well as church-
goers. Many communities in the archipelago 
have traditional structures to regulate rela-
tions between the religious communities. In 
Ambon, it is known as pela, a way of regu-
lating mutual help between the two commu-
nities. In Halmahera the two communities 
Rubble in Ambon. Since the East Timor tragedy of last year, scorched 
earth methods have been used in many parts of East Indonesia. 
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bok east of Bali, where members of the Muslim majority 
burnt down most of the churches in the capital, Mataram, 
and destroyed the homes of the Christian minority, predomi-
nantly of Chinese origin. 
Why is TNI so ineffective? 
Over and over this question is being asked. Ever more 
TNI troops are sent in but the spiral of violence fails to 
abate. On the contrary, things get even worse .. Despite the 
crackdown on the possession of weapons, more and more 
arms are getting into the hands of those involved in the 
conflict. Both sides complain of TNI units taking sides and 
participating in battles. This is clearly true and has even 
been acknowledged by some local TNI commanders. 
Political analysts in Jakarta see the Maluku tragedy as 
being an extension of the power struggle at the centre and 
the latest upsurge of violence in Maluku as basically being 
intended to weaken Wahid's position. There is certainly a 
lot of truth in this. 
There are several answers to the question of the TNI' s 
ineffectiveness. One relates to the erosion of TNI's legiti-
macy. TNI has never been in worse shape than. no~". The 
humiliating defeat in East Timor and the army's mab1hty to 
cope with the military situation in Aceh has greatly affected 
the morale of TNI. 
As guardians of security and order, TNI's reputation 
has been severely dented. For most Indonesians, TNI is not 
seen as a benign force but is regarded as the cause of many 
problems. The possibility of TNI officers being indicted 
for human rights abuses iQ East Timar and Aceh is wel-
comed by many. For more than 30 years TNI was shielded 
from accountability but the end of impunity is nearing [see 
separate article on Impunity]. The fall of Suharto has cre-
ated a new situation. The average TNI soldier cannot be-
have as in the old days. He has to think twice before using 
the same brutal methods and habits of the last three dec-
ades. The Wahid period is gradually establishing civilian 
supremacy over the military which is grudgingly accepted 
by some TNI officers and rejected by others. 
In complex security situations like Maluku the military 
top demands a free hand which means the d~claration of 
martial law and the possibility of using repressive measures 
without having to face a court of law. Some generals have 
openly stated that in the case of .Maluk~, t~ey nee~ ~o go 
'all out'. They are trying to establish the md1spensab1hty of 
the military in security affairs. 
Other analysts go one step further and claim that the 
Maluku tragedy is being deliberately used by some TNI 
hardliners to tum the clock back and gain military domi-
nance again. It is taken for granted that army elements ~re 
involved in the Maluku crisis. Analysts say that ranking 
officers are using the conflict to manoeuvre against Wahid. 
The huge Muslim rally in Jakarta to condemn the Halma-
hera killings is highly likely to have been engineered by 
hardliners in the army. 
One way for the militaryto reverse it's sagging power is 
to enhance the territorial structure. Maluku has become the 
successful test case. In May last year, a new regional com-
mand Kodam XVII, was established for Maluku, while 
North Maluku will soon be upgraded from a sub-district to 
district military command (Ko~em ). Su~h enhan~ement in-
evitably increases the number of troops m the region. How-
ever, some reform-minded officers have proposed the oppo 
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site, favouring the dismantling of ~e territorial structure and 
leaving security matters to the pohce. 
Another explanation of the army' s involvement !s 
linked to economic interests. The central government 1s 
pressing ahead to implement the recently adopted law on 
regional autonomy, placing greater powers in the hands of 
regional parliaments. This will mean local military interests 
losing juicy contracts in fishery, mining and forestry. Ob-
structing decentralisation through riots may be the only 
way to maintain the status quo. 
Despite the evidence that the army is fan~in.g the .con-
flict or directly siding with the combatants, 1t 1s unlikely 
that this sinister plan is the game of the entire TNI struc-
ture. Fanning a religious conflict is a very dangerous game 
and many army officers realise this. As it is, the situation 
in Maluku has reached a point where it will take decades to 
heal the wounds in both communities. 
Lack of action by the government 
Efforts by the Wahid government to overcome the vio-
lence have so far been fruitless and the president has been 
under fire domestically for his lack of action. Vice-
President Megawati, who was put in charge of tackling the 
problems in Maluku has said nothing for months. No won-
der the calls for her to step down have become louder re-
cently. She has failed to work with a team of three elderly 
Malukan statesmen assigned to assist her and has not even 
had the decency to answer their letters. 
Wahid' s visit to Ambon in December was a disappoint-
ment for many. His only advice was for the two communi-
ties to 'sort out their problems themselves'. Within less than 
a fortnight, the violence had exploded again. The M~luku 
crisis that Wahid inherited from his two predecessors is se-
verely straining the fragile political alliance in his govern-
ment. 
More troops were sent in, a sea-cordon was imposed and 
in mid January another peace and reconciliation ceremony 
was held in Jakarta between all the religious leaders of 
Maluku and the Indonesian government. The violence has 
temporarily stopped but the warring parties have not come 
closer at all. Wahid' s earlier statement that the warring par-
ties should solve their own problem is like kicking an open 
door - in the long term, both communities will have to fmd a 
way to live with each other again but swift action is needed 
to prevent more bloodshed and create a situation where hot-
headed individuals from both sides can be contained and the 
more moderate voices in the community can step forward. 
As things stand at present neither of the two communities 
has come up with a feasible or acceptable solution. While 
Muslim leaders are calling for territorial segregation be-
tween Muslims and Christians - a dangerous form of ethno-
religious cleansing - Christian leaders have called for an 
international peace-keeping force which is beyond the ca· 
pacity of the UN to do. 
Summing up the problems 
It is no coincidence that the Maluku tragedy happened in 
a period of economic meltdown and political crisis. The 
more than three decades of Suharto rule ignored ethnic and 
religious conflicts which were deliberately left unresolved. 
A lid was kept on the many grievances and local aspirations. 
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A local government law in 1979 imposed a Javanese style of 
village governance throughout the country, seriously under-
mining traditional structures which have dealt with local 
conflicts for generations. One result of this has been the de-
struction of pela which helped to lock local communities in 
Maluku into mutual-help patterns. 
Open and frank discussions about racial and religious 
matters were simply taboo and swept under the carpet. The 
post-Suharto period has brought everything int? th~ open 
and the glaring truth is there for all to see. Musluns m Ma-
luku suspect Christians of aggressive missionary work 
among Muslims while Christians feel that Islamisation, eco-
nomic and political domination of Islam has become a fact 
of life. 
The Maluku conflict and its many casualties has created 
deep wounds, not only between the people of the tw~ relig-
ions but has also created a deep cleavage between different 
ethnic groups. The migrants in Maluku, mostly from Buton, 
Bugis and Makassar have also been deeply affected and 
most are now living in refugee camps in many places, 
mostly outside Maluku. The fact they are mostly Muslims 
has made Maluku a nation-wide problem which has the po-
tential to explode in any part of the archipelago. 
Reporting in the national and regional press has also of-
ten been very unhelpful. Much of the reporting has been 
continuation of page 13 
server team. This led to West Papua's removal from 
the UN agenda and its delivery, lock, stock and barrel to 
the mercy of the Indonesian military regime . . 
All these exposures provide us with ample material to 
call upon governments around the world to examine their 
own behaviour and that of the UN in that agency's grave 
betrayal of the people of West Papua. * 
All the relevant UN documents of 1969 on West' 
Papua have been compiled together by PA VO, the 
Papuan Peoples Centre for Study and Informa-
tion. 
Contact PAVO, P.O.Box 801, 3500 AV Utrecht, 
the Netherlands, email: pavo@wxs.nl 
very subjective or still worst, siding with one of the camps. 
Muslims denounce Christian-owned newspapers as_ the v~~ce 
of provocateurs while Christians describe the ~ushm ~a1hes 
as being full of lies. Very early in the conflict, Murur, the 
co-ordinator of Kontras, already warned that l~aflet~ con-
taining highly provocative language with the mte~tion of 
sowing hatred were being circulated. In January this :rear, 
Komnas HAM, the National Commission of Human Rights 
produced proof of similar leaflets, intending to provoke both 
communities. 
While political activists in the big cities are inclined to 
see the Maluku tragedy as an extension of_ ~e power ~~g­
gle in Jakarta, people in Maluku see the cns1s as _a rehg1o~s 
conflict, making it more difficult to find a soh~tion .. While 
local political leaders have lost contr~I ?f the situation, the 
same can be said of traditional and rehg1ous leaders. Young 
hotheads listen to their new hard line leaders. 
In the short term, a quick solution appears to be remote. 
All those known to be guilty of provocation must be rounded 
up to create a situation where people can start thinking with 
warm hearts but cool heads. A military solution is no solu-
tion and the troops must be withdrawn as quickly as possi-
ble. 
Serious efforts must be made to create dialogue at the 
grassroots . The ritual of peace ceremonies inherited from the 
Suharto era will resolve nothing, or worse can only intensify 
the conflict. • 
continuation from page 27 
cal prisoners. According to Gustaf Dupe of the Action 
Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners, this 
means that all known political prisoners, including those 
who were convicted on charges of supporting the Free 
Aceh Movement or the OPM in West Papua have now 
been released. 
They also include. all East Timorese who were serving 
lengthy prison sentences in prisons in Java. All have now 
returned home to East Timor and are rebuilding their lives 
with their families. 
Several problems however are still unresolved. One is 
that a decree of the minister of the interior issued in 1981 
which provides for 'guidance and supervision of former 
G30S political prisoners' has not yet been revoked. This 
enables local authorities to harass persons by imposing 
restrictions on their civil rights or requiring them to attend 
indoctrination lectures. Another is that those who were 
convicted on charges of involvement in the alleged G30S 
coup attempt have not been granted abolisi or political re-
habilitation. 
T APOL activists no longer blacklisted 
Two T APOL activists, Liem Soei Liong and Carmel 
Budiardjo, who have been blacklisted from entering Indo-
nesia for many years have now had their names removed 
from the list. 
They met Minister Yusril in London and he immedi-
ately agreed to make the necessary arrangements for them 
to visit Indonesia without further obstructions from immi-
gration. The decision to renew their blacklisting every year 
was taken by the armed forces commander in chief. * 
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Aceh sinks deeper into war 
In the past few months, Aceh has seen killings, abductions, torture, intimidation, harassment, ex-
changes of fire - plunging it into what can only be described as warlike conditions. The violent real-
ity is coupled on the political front by con/ used, contradictory and glaringly empty promises, divi-
sions in government over what to do, a resolute TNI!Polri, determined to wreak bloody havoc. While 
civil society doggedly pursues its call for a referendum, the situation is not assisted by divisions 
within the armed force, GAM. 
The local press is daily replete with facts and figures, 
dates and names - of battered bodies, found under bridges, 
on the roadside, cemented into oil drums or buried in shal-
low graves next to Mobil Oil's pipelines. Gruesome de-
scriptions of those still unidentified - yet to be claimed by 
loved-ones, many of whom are too afraid to come forward. 
So many places - where exchanges of fire, arson, house-to-
house searches, beatings and arbitrary arrests are occurring. 
Names of places that have yet to roll off the tongue to most 
but the people of Aceh. 
So much has happened, so much continues to happen, 
yet the stark reality is that nothing has changed: 
* The systematic use of state violence continues to de-
fine daily life, 
* National and international apathy towards a peaceful 
and democratic resolution of the problem. 
* The civilian population, the parents, students and 
schoolchildren, babies and farmers, scholars and religious 
students - continue to suffer, always the victims. 
As human rights monitors say, the level of violence now 
exceeds what is was during DOM, when Aceh was des-
ignated as a military operations zone. 
Civil society strengthens its commitment 
But we should celebrate the brave and consistent efforts 
of numerous civilian organisations who, with the support 
of the people of Aceh, continue to stand up against the 
violence and intimidation and make their demands in a 
peaceful and democratic way. 
Since Suharto fell, students, NGOs, widows' groups 
and religious scholars have demanded the withdrawal of 
DOM. After students went on hunger strike in July 1998 to 
demand the lifting of DOM, armed forces commander-in-
chief General Wiranto announced its withdrawal on 7 
August 1998. Since then, despite the lack of headlines, 
opposition to the government has been spearheaded by ci-
vilian action. When it was clear that the so-called 
'withdrawal' was in reality an escalation in state violence, 
the demand for a referendum reverberated in late 1998. 
This was followed by a boycott of the general elections in 
June 1999, a two-day general strike in August and a mass 
referendum rally on 8 November when hundreds of thou-
sands descended on Banda Aceh from all over Aceh. 
And as the violence intensified, NGOs and students 
have responded to the humanitarian crisis by organising aid 
to the thousands of displaced people who have sought ref-
uge in schools and mosques. It is a sad indictment of the 
situation that many of these volunteers have been system-
atically harassed, intimidated and of late, beaten and at-
tacked by members of the security forces. 
The latest hunger strike 
On 14 January, fifty volunteers with the People's Crisis 
Centre (PCC) went on hunger strike, in response to in-
creasing intimidation and harassment by both sides in the 
armed conflict being faced by their members, who are 
mostly university and high-school students. The PCC have 
set up posts to distribute aid near the mosques and the 
schools where thousands have gone to escape intimidation 
in their villages. In a situation where the government ad-
ministration in most parts of Aceh is now virtually defunct, 
the people of Aceh have come to look upon the existence 
of the PCC in their villages as their guarantee of safety and 
hope. The PCC decided to carry out their symbolic action 
of an unlimited hunger strike to express concern at the use 
of violence and intimidation against their members 'by the 
parties in conflict with each other, because neither of the 
conflicting sides show any respect for humanitarian work'. 
At least fifteen hunger strikers were taken to hospital 
for treatment after three days because of their deteriorating 
condition but many returned to continue the action outside 
the Banda Aceh office of Komnas HAM, the National 
Human Rights commission. They are 
* Denouncing all who intimidate and use violence 
against humanitarian volunteers; 
* Calling on all sides to respect humanitarian work in 
accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention; 
* Calling for protection from the UN Human Rights 
Commission and other international organisations. 
They say they will continue their hunger strike until 
their demands are met. 
As an example of what they are up against, PCC activ-
ists in Cot Ijue, Matang Geulampang Dua, Aceh Jeumpa 
were attacked in their post on 19 January by members of 
the police crack troops, Brimob. The sound of gunfire was 
heard, forcing the volunteers to postpone a meeting. Soon 
after, having shot in the direction of the PCC offices, Bri-
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mob troops raided the post, smashing windows, setting the 
door on fire and ordering the volunteers out. The male vol-
unteers were kicked and ordered to swallow earth, whilst 
the women were gathered in a house nearby. When a po-
lice truck arrived with the chief of police, one of his offi-
cers beat up PCC co-ordinator Rizanur who later had to be 
treated for his injuries in Bireun General Hospital. In a 
warning to scare the local people away from the PCC, the 
police officers then proceeded to torch a rice mill, houses 
and shops. 
On 16 January, the office of a volunteer NGO called 
Pemraka in West Aceh, was raided by security forces from 
Banda Aceh. This office is also used by SIRA, the Centre 
of Information for a Referendum in Aceh as well as PCC 
volunteers. The only volunteer in the office at the time, 
Murni Dahlan, was threatened. Soldiers held a gun to his 
face, told him to get out and said they would torch the of-
fice later on. After Murni left, they ripped down the office 
board. 
In an earlier incident, members of the security forces 
raided le Rhob PCC in Samalanga, taking medicines, 
smashing up the office and beating the volunteers .. 
Targeting civil society activists 
. Whereas previously the military were targeting ordi-
nary members of the public, mostly males in their twenties 
and thirties, the security forces have recently targeted ci-
vilian activists. By shifting the emphasis, the authorities 
perhaps realise the strength of their movement, the extent 
of the support they receive, and the reality that internation-
ally at least, it is the peaceful, democratic movement which 
is most likely to gamer sympathy and support for the 
Acehnese cause. 
Student activists and students have also been targeted. 
In mid-January, students on a bus from Tapaktuan in South 
Aceh, on their way to sit an exam the following day were 
stopped by members of Battalion 112/DJ on stop-and-
search operations in West Aceh, ordered off the bus and 
taken to the Kuala koramil, West Aceh where they were 
beaten and kicked. Their belongings were seized and they 
were accused of being supporters of a referendum. 
012/TU/Pidie commander, Syarifuddin Tippe, said this was 
not the first time his men had attacked students because 
their behaviour was 'excessive'. 
At least 13 SMUR (Student Solidarity with the People) 
students who were commemorating the Pusong massacre 
of 3 January 1999, were beaten up by members ofBrimob. 
On 4 January, two human rights lawyers, Syaifuddin 
Gani and Nazaruddin Ibrahim, were arrested in Padang 
Tiji, Pidie, by police during a Brimob and Gegana stop-
and-search operation. After being falsely accused of having 
a GAM (Free Aceh Movement) flag, they were taken for 
interrogation to Sigli police station. Three days later, they 
were released though their cases may go to trial. Both are 
human rights activists who have been campaigning to keep 
the human rights issue alive in Aceh, and calling for those 
responsible for abuses to be held accountable. Both have 
received threats. 
On 9 January, Umar, HN, a TV reporter from RCTI, 
and two cameramen, M Jafar from AP and M Khaled from 
Reuters Television Network, were beaten by the security 
forces as they attempted to cover a fire in Lhoksukon, 
North Aceh. Also in South Aceh in December, Nasrun Yu-
nan, a journalist from Aceh Ekspress was beaten up by the 
military in Blang Pidie. 
In South Aceh, two Indonesian nurses working at local 
clinics were tortured and killed, according to a spokesper-
son from the Aluebilie clinic in West Aceh.Religious or-
ganisations have also been targeted. On 9 January, Dahlan, 
22, a member of the Thaliban (religious students) of 
Leubok Pidie . Village, East Aceh, was shot dead by the 
security forces on stop-and-search operations in the area. A 
week earlier, Brimob raided the offices of Ansyarullah and 
Rabithah Thaliban in Banda Aceh. Brimob accusing them 
of stealing motorbikes as they had carried out their own 
stop-and-search operations in the Ulee Lheu area earlier 
that morning. The Thaliban claim to have been trying to 
trace the hundreds of stolen motorbikes reported by local 
people (it is worth noting that when troops of Kostrad 328 
left Aceh on 5 November 1999, the Marines confiscated 
over 400 motorbikes from them, which they had stolen 
from local people and were attempting to take away with 
them). Both offices were ransacked by Brimob, material 
was taken 'in evidence,' motorbikes taken and a number of 
Thaliban arrested. Dozens of Thaliban were arrested and 
released the following day. There are also reports of a 
similar incident in South Aceh where Thaliban offices 
were raided by TNI. 
A coup.le. of days after Tgk Usman Nuris, a religious 
leader, cnt1c1sed the abuse of power by the police, he was 
arrested by the Sabang police and taken to the police sta-
tion, accused of being a provocateur and slapped in the 
face. He was released on the following day. 
Continued escalation of violence 
In the last few weeks, there has been a marked escala-
tion in the level of violence. Civilian deaths and attacks on 
the security forces are all on the increase; the latter are in-
creasingly a feature of life in Aceh. Armed conflict be-
tween the Free Aceh Movement, GAM and TNI, the armed 
forces, seems to be on the increase, with numerous grenade 
attacks on police and military headquarters, as well as traf-
fic police posts and convoys of military and Brimob. Both 
sides claim casualties from the other side which are impos-
sible to confirm independently. 
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Most such attacks have taken place in North Aceh, 
t~ou~h they occur in other areas too. A pattern is now be-
gmnmg to emerge. In many cases, an unknown person (or 
persons) launches a grenade attack - usually on a motor-
bike. The attacker evades capture and when the security 
forces respond, firing in all directions, trying to make an 
~est, innocent civilians are either caught up and injured or 
killed. Alternately, members of the security forces go on 
the rampage, targeting local villages, seeking out members 
of GAM. Over the last few weeks, hundreds of homes and 
shops have been burnt down by members of the security 
forces, Brimob in particular, in what is beginning to look 
like a scorched earth policy. 
For example, on 19 January, a joint. patrol by TNl/Polri 
in Cot Meurebo Village, Kuta Makmur Buloh Blang Ara, 
North Aceh was attacked by two alleged members of GAM 
on a motor cycle. The troops gave chase but the men 
evaded capture. A civilian, Bahri, 22, of Alue Rambe Vil-
lage, Drien Tihang, was shot in the back by troops and 
dragged to their truck. The security forces continued their 
operations, shooting in all directions and terrifying the 
local people. 
A few days earlier, an individual on a motor cycle was 
shot at the Julok police station in East Aceh. Police officers 
came out shooting in all directions, a family of six people 
travelling in a car were all shot and injured. On the next 
day, Gina Lukina, 6, the youngest of the passengers, died 
in hospital of her injuries. The following day, the police 
station in Meurah Mulia, Jungka Gajah, North Aceh was 
hit by a grenade after which the police went on the ram-
page, setting fire to the doors of around 40 shops In Keude 
Karing and Mudi Village, and one pesantren (religious 
school). 
A glance at the local press indicates that there were at 
least twenty grenade attacks on mainly police stations and 
traffic posts during the first three weeks of January and at 
least ten attacks on military and police patrols. 
Who are making the attacks? 
One Acehnese newspaper has called into question the 
identity of the perpetrators of these attacks. The paper 
pointed out that most of those who attack police and mili-
tary posts are armed with rocket or grenade launchers 
(GLM). Lamenting the many civilian casualties and loss of 
property, the paper asked whether these were really actions 
by AGAM (GAM armed forces), as the security forces 
claim, or are they from a different group with its own po-
litical agenda, taking advantage of the existence of GAM? 
It said that local people are beginning to suspect that 
these 'professional' operations are more likely the work of 
people trained over a period of years. Despite the dozens of 
grenade attacks, not one perpetrator has been apprehended, 
even though many of the attacks took place in broad day-
light. So who is behind them? If they are indeed highly 
trained professionals, that leaves two options - the police or 
the military. It is interesting to note that the grenade attacks 
are almost exclusively carried out against the po-
lice.[ Serambi Indonesia, 19 Januarvl 
An earlier report in the same paper described an inci-
dent where members of an airborne infantry unit, Y onif 
Linud 100 PS who were stationed in the sub-district office 
in Kuta Makmur, North Aceh, released a volley of gunfire 
and a grenade near Kuta Makmur army command on 1 O 
ACEH 
November, as if to indicate an exchange of fire. The troops 
had apparently asked Brimob and Gegana, both from the 
police, for help but were refused. After the incident, the 
Linud 100/PS unit carried out house-to-house searches in 
the area, beating up a number of the inhabitants. [Serambi 
Indonesia, 11 November 1999] 
In another incident on 20 November in Meulaboh, West 
Aceh, where government buildings were set on fire after an 
apparent grenade attack, a green beret with military attrib-
utes was found by the police near a government office. 
Interestingly, Central Aceh Chief of Police, Lt.Col Drs 
Misik Natari told the press on 22 November, that forensic 
evidence proved that TNT had been used. However, on the 
same day, Central Aceh Commander of 0106 division, Lt. 
Col. Rochana, said a GLM, not TNT, had been used to 
bomb the building. 
Serambi does not venture an answer to the questions it 
poses, but there do seem to be shadowy groups operating in 
Aceh who tend to be described as provocateurs. Initially, as 
elsewhere in the archipelago, they were called ninja, then 
they became 'GAM-GAMan' or false GAM. Criminal ele-
ments could also be playing a role in the unrest in Aceh. 
No disputing the role of state violence 
The continuing repression by the security forces is in no 
doubt. The number of verifiable cases of civilian arrests by 
members of the security forces, and the discovery of civil-
ian bodies are increasing. This is a direct consequence of 
the 'sweeping' operations by the security forces - stop-and-
search and door-to-door - being conducted all over Aceh 
right down to village level, as well as in Banda Aceh. Pre~ 
viously, searches were carried out in the main along roads 
and the provincial capital Banda Aceh was relatively free 
of military and police activity. One press report [Waspada 
18 Jan.uary] noted the. intensification of police and military 
o~er~t1ons. The. secunty forces are reportedly firing indis-
cnmmately durmg these searches, particularly in the vil-
la~es, ~nd they are often setting villagers' homes and shops 
alight, m what are clearly systematic acts of intimidation. 
In a startling admission, Aceh chief of police, Brig. Gen 
(Pol) Drs Bachrumsyah Kasman, publicly admitted that of 
157 'terrorists' captured from May to December 1999 77 
had died and 12 had been injured. Assuming accurat~ re-
porting, the police chief was effectively admitting to at 
least 77 cases of extra-judicial executions. Asked about 
Brimob's involvement in the arson of civilians' homes and 
shops, ~e denied nothing: 'I regret the action of the security 
forces m the field and apologise for the incidents. They 
were not carried out on my orders.' 
During the same period, he said, 275 houses had been 
set on fire, there had been more disturbances in Aceh and 
this would co~tinue to escalate. Consequently, the ~Cllice 
would now switch strategy, moving from what he called a 
more 'defensive-active' strategy, to a more 'repressive' 
strategy. [Waspada, 2 January] * 
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What is Jakarta doing about Aceh? 
A stalemate has been reached over Ac eh 'sf uture, which the government is ref using to acknowledge. 
The lack of movement suggests that the government is short-sighted, uninformed but also paralysed 
in its efforts to resolve the Aceh problem. Either that, or Indonesia's president is resigned to the 
grim reality that any political resolution will be overruled by members of the security forces. 
For the best part of November and December 1999, 
Aceh dominated political events in Jakarta and continued 
to do so until the escalation in inter-communal conflict in 
Maluku after Christmas Day took over as Jakarta's main 
preoccupation. 
Aceh's demand for a referendum confronts Jakarta with 
the prospect of this richly-endowed territory leaving the 
Republic and creating a huge hole in state revenues and 
foreign exchange earnings. Some of Indonesia's leading 
politicians warn this will result in the country's disintegra-
tion. For the armed forces, the Republic's position as a 
unitary state is sacrosanct and Aceh is the most immediate 
challenge to this holy grail. Few people have the foresight 
or courage to discuss the possibility of Indonesia becoming 
a federation. President Abdurrahman Wahid has even de-
scribed federation as a taboo subject because it revives 
memories of Dutch colonial intentions at the early stages of 
Indonesia's independence. With such fears circulating 
among the Jakarta elite, there is little sympathy for Aceh's 
aspirations. 
Discord at the top 
Quite how inadequate the new government's policies 
are on Aceh, is eloquently illustrated by a brief chronology 
of the government's approach to the problem over the last 
few months, with the military pursuing one agenda and the 
government of Gus Dur, as President Wahid is popularly 
known trying to pursue another. 
Last October, just before becoming president, Wahid 
visited Banda Aceh in an attempt to woo the people, and 
for a brief moment, he succeeded. Surrounded by banners 
calling for a referendum - with an option for independence 
- he told the enthusiastic crowd that he fully supported their 
right to a referendum. Shortly after his inauguration as 
president, he said the government supported a peaceful 
resolution through dialogue, opposed the use of repression, 
and promised the withdrawal of all non-organic troops. 
In November, territorial military commander of I/Bukit 
Barisan (North Sumatra), Major General Rachman Gaffar, 
confirmed the withdrawal, saying that only Battalions 111, 
112 and 113 (organic troops) would remain to handle the 
security situation. In a barely veiled threat however, he 
warned that the withdrawal would lead to an increase in 
GAM violence, that the plan to arrest GAM leaders such as 
Abdullah Syafiie and Ahmad Kandang would have to be 
postponed with dangerous consequences while claiming 
that there were 'no changes ' in how the Aceh problem was 
to be dealt with. 
On the same day, Wahid reiterated Aceh's right to a 
referendum, even referring to East Timor. But he began to 
fudge the issue; things could not be rushed and in any case, 
maybe a referendum in Aceh was not needed. Confusingly, 
he said it was not for him but for the people of Aceh to 
decide and the government would need to figure out a way 
to find out what the people of Aceh wanted. 
The DPR (parliament) said a decision to hold the refer-
endum was a matter for the supreme legislative assembly, 
MPR after consultation with parliament and not for the 
president. Foreign minister Alwi Shihab sought to play 
down Wahid's apparent pledges, saying that although, in 
principle, they had the right to a referendum, there would 
?ave to be consultations with all interested parties, includ-
mg the government administration and the military. 
On 13 November, Wahid completed his volte face. He 
~ow said he fully supported the use of military repression 
m Aceh to thwart the ambitions of a separatist movement. 
'The government,' he said, 'will take firm action against 
individuals or groups who are not prepared to enter into 
talks or who make unreasonable demands which threaten 
the integrity of the territory of Indonesia'. 
Seeking international backing 
Soon after becoming president, Wahid made a number 
of trips overseas, to ASEAN countries, to the US and to the 
Middle East. One of his main reasons for these travels as 
he said repeatedly, was to win support for Indonesia's ~er-
ritorial integrity and undermine international support for 
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Aceh's bid to become independent. While in Washington, 
Wahid agreed to meet activists from the International Fo-
rum for Aceh, including Aguswandi one of Aceh's leading 
student activists who was in the US at the time. Aguswandi 
later told TAPOL that Wahid became extremely angry 
when he explained why a referendum on independence was 
necessary and stormed out of the room. 
Back in Jakarta, Wahid started to give the referendum 
idea a different thrust, saying that it would be about 
whether the Acehnese wanted to adopted Syariah law. 
Meanwhile, the military commander in Pidie called on 
the government to impose martial law in Aceh as the only 
way to cope with deepening security problems. But de-
fence minister Juwono Sudarsono said that the government 
would do no such thing and that seventy per cent of the 
government's efforts would be reconciliatory in nature, 
with the rest being devoted to maintaining law and order. 
He announced that the security presence would be 
strengthened, with an increase in the number of police and 
the marines. Within days, 500 Brimob troops, the special 
police forces, arrived at the Krueng Geukueh Port in Lhok-
seumawe, North Aceh. 
While the chair of parliament's special committee on 
Aceh announced that it would recommend that a referen-
dum should take place, he would not define the options. 
The following day, the speaker of parliament, Akbar Tan-
jung, stated that there was no way that the DPR would 
agree to an option for independence being offered. In fact, 
what was needed was a national referendum on Aceh's 
status. 
On 8 December, Wahid once again reiterated his com-
mitment to the use of repressive means in Aceh. 'The gov-
ernment of Indonesia will not tolerate the efforts of the 
people of Aceh to seek independence, whoever they may 
be and however they are organised.' A few days later he 
claimed to have spoken by phone with GAM's leader in 
Sweden Hasan di Tiro, but on 17 December, a GAM rep-
resentative in Europe, Tgk Yusra Habib Abdul Gani, de-
nied that any such conversation had ever taken place. 
Then national chief of police General Roesmanhadi sa~d 
that security activities in Aceh would ~ave to esc.alate, m 
response to the increasing acts of terror m the provn~ce a~d 
on 24 December, 400 special troops from Medan amved m 
Lhokseumawe. The korem commander, Colonel Inf. Syaf-
nil Armen claimed that they would replace Battalions 111 
and 113 who would be withdrawn 'because they needed 
time to rest'. However, it is clear from ensuing reports that 
both battalions have been active and far from resting. 
'Special status' again 
The central government refuses to comprehend the ex-
tent to which the people of Aceh want a referendum, with 
an option for independence. Talk in Jakarta has variously 
been focused on having a referendum that offers Aceh spe-
cial autonomy, broad autonomy or ordinary autonomy, the 
establishment of Islamic law, the ability to choose their 
own governor and the like. The problem is that the 
Acehnese have been given 'special' status before and is 
still known as Daerah lstimewa Aceh. Even so, in 1989, 
they were rewarded with being designated as a military 
operations zone or DOM. The people of Aceh also know 
that promises of military withdrawal in reality mean an 
escalation in violence. 
ACEH 
Shortly before the New Year, Wahid said that a referen-
dum would be held in seven months' time. The aim was 
to give himself space to make concessions in regard. to 
bringing human rights violators to account and persuadmg 
the Acehnese of the advantages of Jakarta's special status 
offer. Later, while on a visit to Japan, Wahid said the 
Acehnese would have to wait three years, without offering 
any reason for the change. Such chopping and changing 
have only increased the sense of frustration in Aceh and 
convinced Jakarta-watchers that Wahid has failed to come 
up with a well-thought-out strategy. 
Jakarta offers talks 
Despite the confusion, President Wahid confidently 
said on 9 January that the resolution of the Aceh problem 
was imminent. The problem was being dealt with through 
negotiations with a number of groups, he said, implying 
that he was in negotiation with Abdullah Syafiie, AGAM 
commander in Aceh. He had ordered the military to guar-
antee his safety so that he could attend a meeting in Banda 
Aceh later in January. 'I have already told army and police 
commanders to secure his safety. We must not treat him 
like Diponegoro was once treated (by the Dutch). We are 
not a nation of colonialists,' the president said. 
Bowing as always to the authority of their civilian 
master, the TNI then proceeded to raid Abdullah Syafiie's 
hide-out in Glee Jiem Jiem, Bandar Baru, Pidie on 16 
January. According to Pidie district military command 
(Kodim) commander Lt-Colonel Iskandar, TNI 'sniffed 
out' Syafiie where he was hiding and raided his alleged 
headquarters at crack of dawn. After a series of what sound 
like ferocious battles, Syafiie survived and was able to es-
cape. The GAM leader claimed that dozens of Indonesian 
troops were killed, while the army admitted to only a small 
number of casualties. 
The venue of the president's visit to Aceh on 25 Janu-
ary has since been changed from Banda Aceh to the island 
of Sabang. The choice of venue is significant. Sabang can 
be patrolled by naval vessels and is effectively out of 
bounds to demonstrators from the mainland. 
Human rights report 
Meanwhile, a report on atrocities perpetrated in Aceh 
during and after the period of DOM which lasted from 
1989 till 1998, has attracted a great deal of attention in Ja-
karta. The report was the work of an Independent Commis-
sion on Aceh set up by President BJ Habibie which col-
lected evidence about literally thousands of atrocities and 
abuses that had been committed during and after DOM 
The report was submitted to the president and to the 
DPR. On the strength of its contents, the DPR decided to 
summon a number of top-ranking retired generals to ac-
count for developments in Aceh while they were in charge. 
Three retired generals were grilled for more than three 
hours in front of TV cameras and had the nation spell-
bound watching three of the most hated New Order mili-
tary commanders, General Benny Murdani, General Try 
Sutrisno and General Feisal Tanjung, trying to justify the 
brutal actions of troops operating under their commands. 
This was, as many commented later, a never-to-be-
forgotten spectacle. 
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The human rights report identified five particularly hei-
nous crimes for immediate processing before a court of 
law: the rape of a woman in Pidie in 1996; the death of at 
least 39 people in North Aceh in May 1999; numerous ab-
ductions, torture and the extra-judicial killing of a number 
of people in Rumoh Geudong, a notorious torture centre 
run by Kopassus, the much-feared special forces, during 
1997 and 1998; the death of seven people in Idi Cut in Feb-
ruary 1999 and the shooting dead of the religious teacher, 
Teuku Bantaqiah, his wife and 64 of his followers in 
Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh in July last year. 
The Teuku Bantaqiah case will be the first to go to 
court and was due to start before the end of January. 
Twenty men, 18 of whom are military personnel, will be in 
the dock. The highest ranking officer will be a lieutenant-
colonel, which suggests that the officer who ordered the 
massacre has not been included. 
This trials and others to follow are intended by Jakarta 
to show the Acehnese people that those responsible for the 
numerous atrocities during the last decade of the Suharto 
era will at last be brought to justice. It is assumed that this 
will wean the public away from the referendum demand. 
Until now, on the few occasions when army officers 
have been brought to court for human rights abuses, the 
cases have been heard in military courts, before a panel of 
military judges and based on the military criminal code. 
Such trials have always been a travesty of justice, with 
low-ranking officers getting derisory sentences. This time, 
the judiciary has been prevailed upon to come up with 
something more acceptable. 
continuation from page 18 
We are particularly concerned about the search for ac-
countability among the military for the events that took 
place before President Wahid took office. The attempts on 
the part of some military to denied accountability and the 
continued obstrudion of the investigations by Indonesia's 
own attorney general greatly trouble us. If they continue, 
the international pressure for an international commission 
will dramatically increase. [Richard Holbrooke, speaking 
to Indonesian and foreign journalists on 14 January 2000.] 
The Indonesian government should understand that this 
is the only way forward for Indonesia to regain the trust 
and confidence of the international community in the wake 
of the horrific events visited upon the people of East Tim or 
before and after the ballot. On 19 January, foreign minister 
Alwi Shihab held talks with UN secretary-general Kofi 
Annan to persuade him that the KPP-HAM 'must be given 
the authority with no interference from an institutions, in 
The trial will be heard before a so-called koneksitas 
court, using a combination of charges from the military and 
civilian codes and before a mixed panel of judges including 
one military judge. This procedure has been chosen in the 
absence of a properly constituted human rights court with a 
panel of independent and impartial judges, recognised for 
their commitment to human rights. Human rights lawyers 
and activists are unenthusiastic about this procedure and 
fear that it will be little different from past trials of army 
officers. 
Nor is the procedure likely to win over public opinion 
in Aceh. According to Otto Syamsuddin Ishak of Cordova, 
the Institute for Civil Society Empowerment, setting up a 
koneksitas court could be counter-productive. 'For exam-
ple, in the Bantaqiah case, the highest-ranking defendant is 
only a lieutenant-colonel. It is clear that the people of Aceh 
will be angry because they known who did this, that there 
must have been a powerful commander who by-passed 
other seats of power.' [Media Indonesia, 6 January] 
Dispute over more investigations in Aceh 
Soon after electing a new chair and vice-chair in Janu-
ary, the National Human Rights Commission, Komnas 
HAM, announced that it would set up a commission of 
inquiry to go to Aceh. The news was greeted with dismay 
by Hasballah M. Saad, the minister of state for human 
rights. In his opinion, there have already been more than 
enough investigations in Aceh and Komnas HAM would 
be well advised to direct its energies elsewhere. Being him-
self an Acehnese, Hasballah probably fears that yet more 
investigations while the wheels of justice are turning so 
slowly would be counter-productive. * 
eluding the UN' to handle the question of accountability 
for the crimes committed in East Timor, claiming that 
'international interference would be counter-productive 
and would disturb the process'. [Indonesian Observer, 
quoting a government press release.] 
However, the KPP HAM investigations are only one 
part of the process and there is no guarantee that the subse-
quent stages will satisfy international criteria. The new 
government must show the necessary commitment and 
political will to end the cycle of impunity. 
There is little reason to believe that the necessary insti-
tutional changes in the judiciary will take place quickly 
enough to ensure that domestic remedies will be able suc-
cessfully to secure justice with regard to the killings and 
devastation that engulfed East Tim or in 1999. The only 
way forward for proper accountability of members of the 
Indonesian armed forces is for the establishment of an in-
ternational tribunal. * 
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Human rights support committee for Aceh meets 
Acehnese and international human rights NGOs met in Banda Aceh in January to agree on a pro-
gramme to campaign internationally to end human rights abuses in Aceh. It was agreed to lobby the 
IMF to stop releasing funds to Indonesia until human rights abuses are ended in Aceh 
This was the first meeting of the Support Committee for 
Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA) which was set up in 
Bangkok last July. On behalf of the organising committee 
of the meeting, Jafar Sidiq Hamzah told the press that the 
meeting was taking place in response to President Abdur-
rahman Wahid's efforts to isolate the Aceh issue from the 
international community. It was gratifying to see, he said, 
that so many international NGOs were able to attend, in-
cluding Asian Human Rights Watch based in Bangkok, the 
US branch of the International Commission of Jurists, the 
US Committee for Refugees, Forum Asia, ANDI, a South 
East Asian human rights group based in Bangkok, Tha-
masat University, Nindja from Japan and Non-Violence 
International which is based in Washington. TAPOL which 
was one of the founding organisations of SCHRA was un-
fortunately unable to send a representative but sent a warm 
message of support. 
Jafar said that the meeting was not expected to discuss 
the question of a referendum in Aceh as its focus was on 
human rights. However, those who are campaigning for a 
referendum must be perceived as one perspective in the 
democratic process. 
IMF should help 
One of the main decisions was to press the IMF to 
freeze all further credit to Indonesia until the human rights 
situation . in Aceh improves. The newly appointed general 
secretary of SCHRA, Sinopam Samydorai said that the 
IMF should be told that thousands of Indonesian troops 
waging military operations in Aceh were consuming a 
huge proportion of the Indonesian budget. While this con-
tinues, much of the IMF credit granted to Indonesia would 
be used up to fund . these operations. The international 
community should also realise that Aceh contributes about 
twenty per cent to the Indonesian annual budget, with the 
proceeds from the territory's abundant natural resources. 
Samydorai, who is also programme director for Asian 
Human Rights Watch, said that SCHRA would monitor the 
human rights situation in Aceh and work closely with hu-
man rights NGOs in Aceh, in Asia and throughout the 
world. SCHRA would also seek to exert pressure on the 
Consultative Group on Indonesia, the aid consortium 
which next meets next February in Paris, and would also 
call on the member states of the European Union not to end 
its embargo on arms sales to Indonesia. 
Preparations were already underway to submit detailed 
submissions on Aceh to the forthcoming session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights which commences on 20 
March in Geneva, and to press for UN special rapporteurs 
to visit Aceh. Until now, the Indonesian government has 
refused to permit any special rapporteurs to visit Aceh. 
T APOL will be responsible for coordinating human 
rights campaigning on behalf of Aceh in Europe. 
Aguswandi in Amsterdam with Peter-Paul Lelijveld 
from Amnesty International. 
SMUR leader visits US and Europe 
One of Aceh's foremost student activists, Aguswandi, 
spent several months in the US and Europe to campaign on 
behalf of Aceh. He left Aceh at a time when the security 
forces were spreading false information about him and 
branding him as an 'enemy of the state'. Aguswandi was 
one of the founders of SMUR, Students Solidarity with the 
People. 
In the US, he spoke before a number of student meet-
ings and helped to set up a Students Forum for Aceh. Dur-
ing a short visit to London, he addressed a packed meeting 
at the School of Oriental and African Studies and was in-
terviewed by the BBC World Service. He also met several 
British parliamentarians and discussed with them the pos-
sibility of sending a parliamentary mission to Aceh this 
year. He also held several very successful meetings in the 
Netherlands and Germany. * 
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West Papua's 1969 'referendum' re-visited 
In August 1969, the Indonesian authorities conducted an 'Act of Free Choice' in West Papua as re-
quired by an agreement with the Dutch government concluded under UN auspices in 1962. There 
was nothing 'free' about the Act which involved 1,025 hand-picked 'tribal chiefs' who decided at 
gunpoint that their country should remain part of Indonesia. Recently de-classified information 
shows that the West connived in the betrayal. The Dutch government has now acknowledged that the 
1969 Act should be re-examined. 
'I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch or Aus-
tralian Governments putting at risk their economic and 
political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle 
involving a relatively small number of very primitive peo-
ple.' 
British diplomat, 1968 
The Dutch government's decision to review the 1969 
Act announced on 11 December 1999, represents a break-
through. Until now, all western governments have com-
pletely ignored the issue. The Dutch decision came in re-
sponse to pressure from the Dutch Parliament. Member of 
parliament Van Middelkoep of the Gereformeerd Politiek 
Verbond .succeeded in persuading Foreign Minister Van 
Aarsten that a review was called for and the minister sug-
gested that it might be undertaken by the Dutch Institute 
for War Documentation, NIOD, which investigated the 
slaughter of Muslims in Srebrenice, Bosnia. Van Mid-
delkoep said: 'Finally we can look the Papuans straight in 
the eyes.' 
The matter had been raised at a seminar in Amsterdam 
held to mark the thirtieth anniversary on 19 November 
1999 of the UN General Assembly's decision to 'take note 
of' a report on the Act, thereby endorsing the results of the 
Act and removing the question of West Papua from the 
UN' s agenda. 
The task of examining recently de-classified UN docu-
ments in the period up to the conduct of the Act is being 
carried out by John Saltford, a PhD student at Hull Univer-
sity, UK. He gave a lecture at the seminar on West Papua 
in the Netherlands on 20 November 1999. The following 
draws largely on information that he has brought to light. 
The Act of 'Free' Choice took place seven years after 
Indonesia had taken control of the territory under the terms 
of the New York Agreement between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia, brokered by a US diplomat acting for the UN. A 
year before the Act was due to take place, the UN set up a 
team led by Bolivian diplomat Fernando Ortiz Sanz to 
'assist, advise and participate' in the Act. In the event, the 
UN team's role was nothing more than peripheral. 
The three Indonesians who were in control of events in 
West Papua (then known as West Irian) were Brigadier-
General Sarwo Edhie, of the special forces then known as 
RPKAD, who was the military commander of the territory, 
Major-General Ali Murtopo, Suharto's top intelligence 
officer who was put in charge of organising the Act of 
'Free' Choice, and Sudjarwo, a senior official from the 
Indonesian foreign ministry whose task was to liaise with 
the UN. 
Many observers knew at the time that a free vote in 
West Papua would have come down in favour of separa-
tion from Indonesia but Indonesia was determined to pre-
vent this and the western powers, by then enjoying ex-
panding economic ties with Indonesia's military dictator, 
General Suharto, were not minded to stand in their way. 
One British diplomat commented in April 1968: 
The strength of the Indonesian position lies in the fact 
that .. .. they must know that, even if there are protests about 
the way they go through the motions of consultation, no 
other power is likely to conceive it as being in their inter-
ests to intervene. There will be protests from the Papuan 
exiles in Holland, Japan and at the United Nations. I un-
derstand that the exiles may find some support in the Aus-
tralian press. But I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, 
Dutch or Australian Governments putting at risk their eco-
nomic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of 
principle involving a relatively small number of very 
primitive people. 
Three months later, these sentiments were echoed in a 
British Foreign Office communication: 
The plain fact is that there is no other solution than for 
Indonesia to keep West Irian,· no one is thinking in different 
terms; and no responsible Government is likely to com-
plain so long as the decencies are carried out. 
In May 1968, the British High Commissioner in Can-
berra reported that from Australia's point of view, 'the 
more quietly the act of self-determination passes off next 
year, the better '. 
[These comments were echoed seven years later in mid 
1975, when British, US and Australian diplomats in Jakarta 
were making recommendations to their governments in 
secret c~~le~ about. ho~ the~r counti:ies should respond to 
Indonesia s 1mpendmg mvas1on of East Timor.] 
UN envoy collaborates in the betrayal 
Ortiz Sanz made two short visits to West Papua in 1968 
and sent some grossly inaccurate reports to the UN secre-
tariat in New York which was headed at the time by Sec-
retary-General U Thant, about conditions in the territory 
which bore no relation to the well documented unpopular-
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ity and brutality of the Indonesian military rule. De-
classified documents show that the Indonesians were keen 
to keep his visits to West Papua as brief as possible. Indo-
nesian officials complained in December 1968 that his visit 
had caused a 'certain excitement' among the Papuans 
which was obstructing the smooth running of the territory 
and it would be better if he spent more time in Jakarta 
where accommodation would be much more luxurious. 
There was some sparring between Ortiz Sanz and Indo-
nesian officials about whether the principle of 'one person, 
one vote' as required by 'international practice' under the 
1962 New York Agreement would be applied. This was 
anathema to the Indonesians who said they would conduct 
the Act in accordance with the 'Indonesian practice' of 
musyawarah or reaching consensus . Eight Indonesian-
appointed regional councils of tribal leaders would take 
part in the Act. 
In an attempt to preserve a modicum of democratic 
practice, the UN envoy proposed a mixed system, which 
would involve direct voting in some urban areas, but this 
too was rejected out of hand by the Indonesians. 
After his second visit to West Papua in December 1968, 
Ortiz Sanz indicated in a report to UN headquarters in New 
York that he was aware of anti-Indonesian feelings in the 
territory but had found it difficult to make free contact with 
local people because his team had been followed every-
where by Indonesian officials. Yet his report shows that he 
had nothing but contempt for the local people: 
Of course, when the moment arrives, it would be very 
difficult indeed to assess the real importance of such anti-
Jndonesian sentiment since, as you are very well aware, 
only a very insignificant percentage of the population is 
capable of or has interest in engaging in any political ac-
tions or even thoughts .... The tour has confirmed my initial 
impressions .... that the implementation of the provisions of 
the New York Agreement relating to self-determination 'in 
accordance with international practice' is, indeed impossi-
ble. 
This report elicited a reply from Rotz-Bennett, the UN 
deputy secretary general, echoing Ortiz Sanz' racist senti-
ments. He wrote that 'the lack of development of the 
population stood out all too clearly' . 
'Elections' 
As the Act drew near, UN officials were getting appre-
hensive, fearing that the blatant rigging of the Act could 
make it difficult to get the final results of the Act through 
the UN General Assembly without widespread opposition. 
They urged the Indonesians to stage elections for some of 
the councils and, to their surprise, the Indonesians agreed. 
The nature of these 'elections' was revealed by an 
Australian journalist, Hugh Lunn, who was filing stories 
for the Sydney Morning Herald. In August 1999, Lunn was 
interviewed in a documentary shown on Australian televi-
sion which included footage of Lunn attending one of these 
'elections'. Some Indonesians wearing dark glasses, who 
were obviously military intelligence officers, were shown 
going into the midst of a sullen and silent crowd of Papu-
ans and bringing out six men they themselves had selected 
to 'represent' the community. While this was going on, 
Lunn reports, the crowd suddenly began cheering as three 
of their fellow-countrymen at the back of the crowd un-
furled banners calling for genuine elections; they were im-
mediately arrested and taken away. When Lunn appealed 
WEST PAPUA 
to Ortiz Sanz who was also present, to intervene, he re-
fused, saying that he was simply there to observe. 
The British government was well aware of what was 
going on. A Foreign Office briefing sent to the UK mission 
in New York on 10 September 1969 said: 
The Indonesians took great care to ensure, in all ways 
open to them, that the chosen representatives would vote in 
favour of West Irian remaining in Indonesia. 
Getting the Act through the UNGA 
One of the recurring themes in the de-classified UN 
documents is the machinations of UN officials to ensure 
that when the final result of the Act was presented to the 
General Assembly for approval, it would go through with 
as little fuss as possible. The documents show that Indone-
sia's senior civilian official in West Papua, Sudjarwo was 
worried about the Dutch government's response regarding 
the way the Act had been conducted. Ortiz Sanz, in a grave 
breach of his neutral role as UN envoy charged to ensure 
the fair conduct of the Act, told his superiors in New York: 
I advised him privately though emphatically that his 
Government should try to obtain assurances that the Neth-
erlands' Government would not cast any doubt on, or 
challenge, the Act of Free Choice. This would prevent a 
heated debate in the General Assembly. 
Another document reveals that Secretary-General U 
Thant was himself not averse to advising the Indonesians 
on how to expedite an easy ride at the General Assembly. 
He wrote to Sudjarwo as follows: 
The Indonesian Government would have to consult very 
diligently with the Members of the General Assembly for 
the purpose of preventing the submission of a draft resolu-
tion touching on the substance of the West lrian matter. 
A briefing from the British Foreign Office, sent on 10 
September 1969 to the British mission at the UN in New 
York said: 
The delegation should ... avoid taking part in any de-
bate on the item . ... We expect the Secretary-General's 
report to put the best face on the completion of the Act, and 
to avoid criticism of the Act 
A slight hitch in the proceedings 
In the event, when the Indonesians had got the 
'unanimous' result they wanted and Ortiz Sanz presented 
his report to the General Assembly in November 1969 
along with reports from the Secretary-General and the In-
donesian government, several African countries con-
demned the exercise for being undemocratic and called for 
a proper act of self-determination to be held in 1975. They 
tabled an amendment to the resolution before the General 
Assembly to this effect. The resolution was defeated by 60 
votes to fifteen, with 39 abstentions. 
With little further discussion, the General Assembly 
then decided by 84 votes to none, with thirty abstentions 
simply 'to take note' of the Secretary-General's report that 
the people of West Papua had opted unanimously to remain 
with Indonesia. 
That low key formulation was the farthest the General 
Assembly would go in revealing its discomfort with what 
had happened in West Papua under the eye of a UN ob-
continued on page 4 
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The danger of a military take-over ? 
Since mid December rumours of a coup d'etat by the military have been swirling in Jakarta. They 
intensified when on 14 January Richard Holbrooke, US Ambassador to the UN and concurrently 
president of the UN Security Council warned Indonesian generals that they would/ace international 
isolation if they went ahead with their plans. 
Politics in Indonesia have changed fast since the down-
fall of Suharto in May 1998. Analysts are often forced to 
revise their conclusions by the day because of the quick 
pace of events. One important parameter, the dominance of 
the military on the political scene, has drastically changed. 
The TNI, the Indonesian armed forces, has a reputation of 
disrepute among the general public. Problems in Aceh, 
West Papua, Maluku and recently Lombok are generally 
perceived by the public as problems deliberately created by 
elements in the TNI. 
The imminent danger of army officers being put on trial 
because of their misdeeds in East Tim or and Aceh [see 
separate article] has infuriated army officers. The average 
officer still believes that he was simply doing his job. TNI 
officers feel that the reform movement is targeting the TNI, 
which is more than true. Indonesian political reform cannot 
proceed without a total overhaul of the TNI. 
Since May 1998 TNI' s powers have been slashed con-
siderably: military involvement in the civilian administra-
tion has been cut back and dwifungsi, formal military in-
volvement in politics, has also been downsized. But one 
large chunk of power, the territorial structure including its 
local economic interests, is still intact. The bulk of TNI 
officers are afraid that this last bastion is also under threat. 
[see also TAPOL Bulletin No. 154/155, November 1999]. 
Reform versus status-quo 
Never in the history of mankind has a group voluntarily 
surrendered power and this also applies to the TNI. The 
sacking of Major-General Sudradjat as TNI spokesperson 
by President Wahid highlights the deepening conflict be-
tween the civilians and the military at the pinnacle of the 
power pyramid. This high-powered general has been 
openly defying the policies of the new Wahid government 
and went as far as to challenge the position of the civilian 
Wahid as Panglima Tertinggi (Pangti),, the Supreme 
Commander of the TNI. In the Suharto period this was 
never challenged, Suharto being an army general himself. 
The Pangti has the ultimate right to appoint and sack 
the people holding top positions within the TNI. Already 
under Suharto it often created problems because he chose 
people based on loyalty and not on skills but the civilian 
Wahid is seen as a complete outsider, meddling with TNl's 
internal affairs. 
acter assassination. Sudradjat fiercely attacked the findings 
of KP P Ham, the Commission of Investigation for East 
Timor, describing it as a creation of Mary Robinson, the 
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights. 
Sudradjat's replacement by Rear Marshall Graito 
Usodo fits into the strategy of the present government to 
promote reform elements within the TNI. For the first time 
in history, an air force officer will hold the important post 
of TNI spokesperson. 
For more than a year, an open battle raged between the 
reform generals and the status quo generals. The reform 
generals say that the TNI should stay out of politics and 
problems like Aceh, Maluku or West Papua cannot be re-
solved by military means. The hard-liners insist that these 
problems should be dealt with by giving the military the 
legal means to go 'all out'. Sooner or later, this conflict 
will escalate and it is crystal clear which side the civilians 
will support. 
Civilian supremacy Sudradjat's challenge did not come out of the blue. He 
represents the view of the majority of officers who feel 
uncomfortable in the new political situation and are accus- The Wahid government is Indonesia's first democrati-
ing civilians of sawing off the legs of their chair and char- cally elected government since 1955. Despite its many 
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weaknesses it expresses the willingness to overcome the 
historical burden it inherited from the 32-year dictatorship 
under Suharto. In the Suharto days the government and 
TNI were basically one entity; in the present situation the 
TNI is supposed to be subordinate to the government. 
TNI enjoyed overwhelming power during the Suharto 
era, expressed in many ways. There were many army per-
sonnel in the central and local administration, there were 
juicy business contracts for army officers and an almost 
absolute impunity, to name just a few of their privileges. 
Already during the Habibie transition, many of these 
privileges were withdrawn. 
The Wahid government has tried even harder to curb 
the TNI's previous dominance. However, Wahid has a 
reputation of having good relations with t~e army and one 
can hardly expect radical reforms from him. At the same 
time he realises that reform must continue which means 
that the TNI will have to change their style and habits. 
It started by appointing a civilian as Minister of De-
fence, which is both good and bad. Yuwono Sudarsono, 
the new appointee, is known to be a military-friendly aca-
demic and one cannot expect major reforms from him. All 
the signs are that Cilangkap, TNI headquarters, are not co-
operating well with the new minister and Yuwono is seen 
in public as a lame duck. 
Two top reform generals were given posts in the cabi-
net. Lt.General Bambang Yudhoyono was appointed Min-
ister of Mining and Energy while Lt. General Ag.um. Gu-
melar got the job as Minister of Telecommumcattons. 
These appointments are more bad than good. On the one 
hand Wahid wanted to reward the two reformers by 
bringing them into the cabinet but on the other, taking two 
top reformers out of the TNI has strengthened t.he position 
of the hard liners in Cilangkap. The two appomtees have 
not hidden their discontent at having had to leave the army 
with unfinished business. 
Another well-meant measure was the appointment of 
Admiral Widodo as TNI commander-in-chief. Never in the 
history of the TNI has the highest post been occupied by a 
non-army officer. But in practice this measure also back-
fired because Admiral Widodo does not wield the author-
ity t~ tell the army generals what to do and he is seen as a 
Wiranto man, having been appointed deputy commander-
in-chief when Wiranto was still commander-in-chief. 
Wiranto versus the civilians 
The most influential military man remains General Wi-
ranto, although he lost out in the present cabinet by having 
to relinquish his position as Minister of Defen~e/1:NI 
Commander-in-Chief. His present post as Coordmatmg 
Minister of Security and Politics no longer gives him di-
rect command over the troops but as a senior officer along 
with his close ties with Admiral Widodo, he still wields 
considerable political clout which he uses to the utmost. 
Significantly, he has refused to retire from the army which 
he should have done on taking a non-military post. . 
Wiranto has survived three governments, he climbed 
up the ladder as a Suharto aide, was maintained by Habibie 
and also by Wahid. In his period as TNI .command~r, all 
kind of terrible events occurred. The tragic events m Ja-
karta in May 1998, the atrocities in Aceh, West Kaliman-
tan, Central Java, Maluku and West Papua. Th~ September 
tragedy in East Timor also happened un?~r hts. co~man-
derer-ship. It is more than obvious that civil society m In-
donesia wants to get rid of Wiranto. He has become the 
MIL/~ 
embodiment of the 'old' TNI, the ones who resist reform 
and want to cling to the status quo of the Suharto era. 
Both Habibie and Wahid have treated Wiranto with silk 
gloves. It could even be argued th~t Hab}bie's appoi~tment 
as President was largely due to Wtranto s manoeuvring by 
abandoning Suharto' s sinking ship. Wahid ow~s Wi~anto 
no favours and has increasingly taken a negative attitude 
towards Wiranto; he recently said that if Wiranto is found 
guilty of misdeeds in East Tim or he will be discharged. 
Several TNI strongholds have been left relatively intact. 
This includes BAIS, the military intelligence, KOPASSUS, 
the notorious red berets commando and KOSTRAD, the 
reserve troops. The Kopassus leadership was replaced im-
mediately after Suharto's downfall but otherwise the force 
was left unscathed. Wahid has now appointed an air force 
rear marshal as head of BAIS, an unprecedented reform 
measure. But otherwise President Wahid remains a man of 
extreme caution in his handling of the TNI. His recent visit 
to the Kopassus barracks when he heaped praise on this 
force of uniformed thugs for their past performance is puz-
zling for the reformasi movement. It was the Kopassus 
who did all the dirty work in East Timor, West Papua and 
Aceh and it was Kopassus who kidnapped Indonesian ac-
tivists in the heyday of the Suharto era. 
How imminent is a coup? 
It is highly unlikely that Wiranto and the generals will 
launch a straight forward coup against the Wahid govern-
ment. Both Wahid and Megawati enjoy popular support 
which the military Jack. Internationally, as expressed by 
Richard Holbrooke, a coup attempt will be disastrous for 
Indonesia and will tum Indonesia into a pariah state. 
It is more likely that sections of the military will con-
tinue to create disturbances like Lombok [see separate arti-
cle] to create the impression that the Wahid government is 
incapable of dealing with pressing domestic political 
problems. Perhaps they hope that this will force parliament 
to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. This is 
the scenario which is now being referred to a 'creeping 
coup'. 
At the same time a layer of officers is emerging with a 
totally new paradigm and are willing to accept subordina-
tion to a civilian government. This group of officers agree 
that the TNI is ultimately a force for the defence of the 
realm and security and order is for others to take charge of. 
They also accept the basic premise that violence solves 
nothing and only interaction and communication can help 
conflict resolution. * 
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How to end the cycle of impunity 
For 35 years, members of the Indonesian armed forces have committed innumerable crimes against 
humanity in Indonesia as well as in East Timor, safe in the knowledge that they will never be held 
accountable. Impunity has been the shield behind which crimes have continued unabated while the 
international community has supported Indonesia economically and with arms. This may now be 
coming to an end if investigations into crimes in East Timor result in trials at home or before an in-
ternational tribunal. 
Two very well publicised events in Jakarta signalled a 
change in climate. One was the televised grilling of three 
acting and retired generals before a parliamentary panel on 
their responsibility for atrocities in Aceh. The other was the 
appearance of General Wiranto until recently commander 
in chief of the armed forces (TNI), and other generals be-
fore a commission of inquiry set up by the National Human 
Rights Commission into crimes against humanity commit-
ted in East Timor. Can these events signal an end to the 
cycle of impunity in Indonesia? 
Crimes against humanity in East Timor 
In September 1999, the UN's Commission for Human 
Rights (UNCHR) decided to set up an international com-
mission of inquiry into the orgy of killings and scorched 
earth that struck East Timor during the run-up to and fol-
lowing the ballot on 30 August when o".er 78 per cent of 
the population voted in favour of independence. 
Realising that this could lead to the UN setting up an 
international tribunal to try Indonesian officers for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity in East Timor, the Indo-
nesian government, still then under President Habibie, 
hastily enacted a presidential decree in lieu of law for the 
formation of a human rights court. At the same time, the 
National Commission for Human Rights (KomnasHAM) 
set up a Commission to Investigate Violations of Human 
Rights (KPP-HAM) to investigate abuses committed after 
the ballot in East Timor. 
The scene was thus set for two investigations, one do-
mestic and one international. This had been foreseen by the 
UNCHR resolution which stipulated that the international 
commission of inquiry should work 'in cooperation with 
the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights ... 
to gather and compile systematically information on possi-
ble violations of human rights and acts which may consti-
tute breaches of international humanitarian law committed 
in East Timor since ... January 1999'. The resolution also 
affirmed that 'the primary responsibility for bringing per-
petrators to justice rests with national judicial systems'. 
The UN's commission of inquiry came into being in 
late October after much foot-dragging at the UN and 
ECOSOC, with a mandate to investigate human rights 
violations in East Timor since the beginning of 1999 and to 
complete its work and report to the UN Secretary-General 
by the end of 1999. The five-member commission headed 
by Sonia Picado of Costa Rica, with members from Nige-
ria, India, Papua New Guinea and Germany, visited East 
Timor for two weeks in November and December. 
The UNCHR resolution also provided for three UN 
Special Rapporteurs - for extra-judicial killings, torture and 
vi?lence against women - and the UN Working Group on 
Disappearances to conduct investigations in East Timor. 
KPP HAM presses ahead 
Although there was initial scepticism from several in-
ternational NGOs, including T APOL, about the independ-
ence and sincerity of a commission associated with Indone-
si~' s Komnas HAM whose record of investigations in East 
T1mor has been rather disappointing, it soon became ap-
parent that KPP-HAM was determined to collect evidence 
about atrocities in East Timor, to seek out those responsible 
for the horrific events in East Timor and to collect evidence 
about the role of TNI officers in instigating, aiding and 
abe_tting the activities of the pro-integration militia groups 
which had come into being during the course of 1999. 
Durin~ their first investigations in November, they 
gathered information and collected eye-witness testimonies 
of some of the worst atrocities including the killing of sev-
eral hundred people at a church in Suai on 6 September. 
They questioned witnesses in Suai who testified that the 
local TNI command had been directly involved in the kill-
ings. In West Timor, they found the graves of the three 
priests who had been gunned down outside the church and 
more than a dozen victims of the massacre and obtained 
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eye-witness accounts that army trucks had been used to 
transport the bodies. 
Following their investigations, KPP-HAM summoned 
General Wiranto and questioned him for more than three 
hours. The general later told the press he had agreed to ap-
pear before the KPP-HAM because 'the matters in hand 
should be resolved between us as a domestic affair without 
letting outsiders clean up our household', thus confirming 
that he had appeared in order to protect himself and other 
top TNI officers from the humiliation of facing an interna-
tional tribunal. 
General Wiranto denied that the Indonesian army had a 
policy 'of carrying out genocide or crimes against human-
ity'. He insisted that the TNI as an institution 'had never 
issued orders or encouraged the burning of cities, the kill-
ing of people or the compulsory evacuation of the popula-
tion'. Much of the questioning revolved around Wiranto's 
responsibility as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 
Three major-generals, Zacky Anwar Makarim and 
Syafrie Syamsuddin both intelligence ~fficers,. ~d Adam 
Damiri who was commander of the regional military com-
mand in Bali, as well as Colonel Timbun Silaen, who was 
chief of police in East Timor, and Colonel Tono Suratman, 
the military commander of East Timor, have also appeared 
before the commission, using the occasion in an attempt to 
clear their names and refute eye-witness testimony ob-
tained by KPP-HAM investigators during their visits to 
East Timor. 
In an attempt to discredit the KPP-HAM, the generals 
have accused it of pursuing an anti-Indonesia agenda, of 
being funded by money from abroad and of basing its ~vi­
dence on information from Interfet (UN peace-keepmg 
force in East Timor), a body that has been much maligned 
in Indonesia for alleged interference in Indonesian domes-
tic affairs. They want to portray KPP-HAM as serving for-
eign interests. Some of its members have even been threat-
ened with physical violence. 
International humanitarian law 
Since the end of the Second World War, a body of law 
has evolved to cover crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, which together are known as International Hu-
manitarian Law. The Nuremberg Trial of sixteen nazi war 
criminals in 1946 was based on the Nuremberg Charter 
adopted by the four victorious Allied Powers in Aug~st 
1945, defining the crimes for which these men were m-
dicted and convicted. Then came the four Geneva Conven-
tions adopted in 1949, the fourth of which deals with the 
protection of civilians in time of war; its provis~ons incl~de 
safeguarding humane treatment for persons . m occupied 
territories and is therefore applicable to East Timor. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
brutality ordained by a government or at least by an or-
ganisation exercising political power. ' [See Geoffrey Rob-
ertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global 
Justice, 1999] 
Crimes against humanity listed under Article 7 of t~e 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (agreed on m 
Rome in 1998 but still awaiting ratification) include: Mur-
der extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population, imprisonment or other severe deprivati~n of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of mte~­
national law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prosti-
tution, or any other sexual violence of comparable gravity, 
enforced disappearance of persons, and other inhuman acts 
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
In addition, war crimes include: Extensive destruction 
of property, not justified by military necessity, unlawful 
deportation or transfer. taking of hostages, directing attacks 
against the civilian population, the transfer by the Occu-
pying Power of parts of its own civilian population to the 
territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or 
parts of the population of ~he occu~ied ~erritory withi~ or 
outside this territory, intentionally dtrectmg attacks agamst 
buildings used for religion, education, art, science or 
charitable purposes. 
No stretch of the imagination is needed to see the appli-
cability of these crimes to East Tim or's 24 years of suffer-
ing. 
Command responsibility 
One crucial part of international humanitarian law is 
the principle of 'command responsibility', making senior 
officers liable to prosecution for the criminal acts commit-
ted by their subordinates. Article 28 of the ICC Statute 
states that a military commander shall be criminally re-
sponsible for crimes . . . committed by forces under his or 
her effective command and control as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where 
that military commander or person either knew or, owing 
to the circumstances at the time, should have known that 
the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and that a military commander or person failed to 
take all necessary measures within his or her power to pre-
vent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to 
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
The principle of command responsibility clearly makes 
it impossible for General Wiranto to argue in a court of law 
that he was unable to halt the crimes being committed in 
East Timor in the wake of the ballot results being an-
nounced on the grounds that they were motivated by 
'psychological factors' or subsequently to do nothing dur-
ing the period of martial law imposed on 7 September to 
bring those guilty to court. 
National or international trials? 
The Nuremberg Trial and the Geneva Conventions 
gave birth to the concept of universal j~ris_diction, _impos-
ing an obligation on every state to assist m the tnal and 
punishment of such crimes wherever they may have ?ee!1 
committed. This means that states have the power mdi-
vidually or collectively to conduct a ~ial even if they _have 
no link with the place where the cnme was committed. 
'The concept of universal jurisdiction for crimes against Indonesia's Attorney General Marzuki Darusman who 
humanity is the solution that international law offers to the set up KKP-HAM when he still chaired Komnas HAM, 
spectacle of impunity for tyrants and torturers wh~ cover has often said that KPP-HAM was established to make it 
themselves with domestic immunities and amnesties and possible for the generals be tried in Indonesia. 'If not, they 
pardons .... What sets a crime against h~manity apart, both will be dragged before an international tribunal,' he has 
in wickedness and in the need for speczal measures or de- said. The KPP-HAM's investigations are only the begin-
terrence, is the simple fact that it is a crime of unforgivable ning of a lengthy process, the later stages of which will be 
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in the hands of prosecutors who will take charge of judicial 
investigations and decide whether those identified by KPP-
HAM are to be indicted. 
As PBHI, the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights 
Association, has pointed out, all the painstaking investiga-
tions undertaken by the KPP-HAM are in danger of being 
swept under the carpet if the suspects are brought before a 
court that is not suited to the necessary legal norms. 
An international tribunal will be unlikely to accept the 
principle of 'double jeopardy' if suspects are tried by na-
tional courts in which the suspects are tried for ordinary 
crimes, not for crimes against humanity as defined under 
international humanitarian law, if the courts do not meet 
the criteria of independence and impartiality and are con-
vened primarily to protect the suspects against being in-
dicted before an international tribunal, and if sentences are 
deemed inappropriate to the gravity of the crime. 
Everything depends on whether domestic remedies will 
work but is this likely to happen? 
Munir, arguably Indonesia's most outspoken 
human rights lawyer 
Law to protect generals from justice 
A draft law for the creation of a human rights court 
which is soon to be submitted to Parliament has excluded 
the principle of retroactivity. It stipulates that crimes com-
mitted before the court is established cannot be tried before 
the court. This automatically excludes all the crimes 
against humanity perpetrated in East Timor as well as 
atrocities perpetrated in Aceh and West Papua. The draft 
law stipulates that 'grave crimes' shall be taken before a 
truth and reconciliation commission (not yet set up). Such a 
draft is clearly intended to protect Indonesian generals 
from facing justice for their heinous crimes in East Timor. 
Munir a member of the KPP HAM, has condemned the 
decision ~f the government. He told the press [ Kompas, 24 
Jamuary] that neither he not Asmara Nababan, secretary 
general of the KPP HAM who are both members of the 
government's committee to draft ~he law had been c~n­
sulted about this provision. He insists t?at at an earl!er 
stage, the draft provided for a 15-year penod. of re~oa~t1v­
ity. If this draft becomes law, he said, all the mvest1gat1ons 
undertaken by the KPP HAM will be utterly wasted. 
Idfhal Kasim of ELSAM, an organisation that has lent 
its support for the creation of a truth and reconciliation 
commission, said that such a commission was only in-
tended to consider human rights violations perpetrated too 
long ago to be able to produce evidence that would stand 
up in a court of law. 
Koneksitas courts 
Until now, on the few occasions when officers have 
been charged in connection with involvement in atrocities, 
they have been tried in military courts under the military 
criminal code, charged with nothing more than 'procedural 
errors', 'exceeding orders' or 'depriving persons of their 
liberty' and received derisory sentences. Nor have senior 
officers in positions of command responsibility been made 
accountable. 
In the absence of a human rights court, the Indonesian 
judiciary has opted to create special mixed courts 
(koneksitas) at which suspects will be tried before a panel 
of civilian and military judges. Fearing the opprobrium that 
would erupt in the post-:Suharto era if military officers are 
yet again tried by military courts, the present government 
has chosen to compromise, offering a sop to the army by 
ensuring that military judges are on the panel of judges. 
This gravely compromises the independence and imparti-
ality of koneksitas courts. 
A trial before such a court is due to start soon to try a 
group of officers for violations in Aceh, North Sumatra 
where thousands were murdered, raped, tortured or 
'disappeared' during the last decade of Suharto's rule. The 
most senior officer in the dock will be a lieutenant-colonel, 
itself a sign that nothing has changed. It remains to be seen 
whether the accused will face charges under the military or 
the civil criminal code neither of which provide for charges 
for crimes against humanity. 
International tribunal the only way for-
ward 
Koneksitas courts will not be acceptable internationally. 
If the Indonesian Government wishes to avoid the humilia-
tion of having its military officers tried by an international 
tribunal, it could set up ad hoc extra-judicial courts served 
by panels of ad hoc judges appointed for their known in-
tegrity and independence, ensure that trials are preceded by 
investigations undertaken by ad hoc independent prosecu-
tors and that international humanitarian law is used to in-
dict the defendants. 
Failing this and in the absence of appropriate judicial 
arrangements for the trial of Indonesian senior officers in-
volved in the atrocities committed in East Timor during the 
last year of the Indonesian occupation, an international tri-
bunal offers the only way forward for justice to be done. 
The point was made unambiguously by Richard Hol-
brooke, US ambassador to the UN in New York who sits 
on the Security Council: 
continued on page Jo 
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East Timorese trapped in West Tim or 
Four months after the East Timorese people threw off the yoke of Indonesian colonialism, there are 
still some 150,000 East Timorese trapped in refugee camps in West Timor. They account for almost 
a quarter of the total East Timorese people. They are being intimidated and live in atrocious condi-
tions. Many hundreds have died, especially children. This is a grave humanitarian crisis. 
The leader of the East Timorese people, Xanana Gus-
moa, said recently; 'East Timor's greatest natural resource 
is its people.' But, writes Richard Lloyd Parry in The Inde-
pendent [9 January 2000], 'when the country needs it most, 
even that one resource is seriously, and mysteriously, de-
pleted.' 
On 4 September 1999, the UN announced the official 
result of the 30 August ballot which showed that the East 
Timorese had voted overwhelmingly for independence 
from Indonesian rule. Six weeks later, in October, the In-
donesian supreme assembly, the MPR, under immense in-
ternational scrutiny, ratified the result, ending the 24-year 
struggle for East Tim or's independence. 
After the intensive press coverage of the violence that 
erupted in the wake of the ballot announcement, the media 
glare on this part of the world has shifted. However, four 
months on, the Indonesian authorities are still dictating 
events to a large, displaced East Timorese population. 
Systematic depopulation 
The massive post-ballot depopulation of East Timor re-
sulted in what may have been up to 250,000 East Timores.e 
becoming unwilling refugees in West Timor. This was not 
a population fleeing in panic from their· homes as has hap-
pened in so many countries, but a systematic and well-
organised movement of people by the Indonesian armed 
forces and their militia proxies, acting in revenge for East 
Timor's bold rejection of its Indonesian occupying force. 
This is highlighted by the fact that people were still moving; 
across the border up to three weeks after the eruption of the 
violence, and after the arrival of the first lnterfet troops in 
East Timor on 20 September. 
Testimonies from refugees who have since returned to 
East Timor clearly show that many were forced to go to 
West Timor at gunpoint. Many are also quick to point out 
that this therefore made them hostages and not refugees. 
The similarity in stories from refugees from different dis-
tricts across East Timor also points to the fact that the de-
population campaign was organised, comprehensive and 
evidently pre-planned. 
Plans for this mass deportation go back at least to 5 
May 1999, the day when the accords for the ballot were 
signed in New York between Indonesia, ·Portugal and the 
UN. On that day, the deputy chief of staff of the Indonesian 
army, Lt. General Jhoni Lumintang cabled Major-General 
Adam Damiri, who was the regional military commander 
of the region that included East Timor instructing him to 
prepare security contingency plans for either outcome of 
the ballot. If the result was a rejection of autonomy and a 
separation from Indonesia then Damiri should have plans 
ready for the 'evacuation' of East Timorese. 
In July, by which time top Indonesian generals were 
being forced . to accept that the vote would go against them, 
a senior officer working on the staff of General Feisal 
Tanjung, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security 
Affairs in the Habibie government, wrote to his boss out-
lining contingency plans in readiness for the defeat of the 
autonomy option. The letter, signed by H.R. Gamadi, said 
the plan would include a huge influx of evacuees from East 
Timor into West Timor and the destruction of 'vital facili-
ties' all along the evacuation route. [See TAPOL Bulletin, 
No 154/155, November 1999] 
Having planned the evacuation, the TNI were also 
deeply involved in its completion. Army trucks and vehi-
cles brought over from West Timor were used to transport 
East Timorese to Indonesian West Timor. In some cases, 
East Timorese families were transported out by sea. TNI 
soldiers accompanied the refugee trucks across the border. 
Reports were received at the time that many of the men 
were separated from the women and children. Some are 
thought to have been killed; many are thought to have been 
forcibly recruited into the militia gangs. 
Many members of the two TNI battalions, 744 and 745, 
composed largely of East Timorese soldiers, later made 
their way across to West Timor to join forces; they still 
maintain a presence inside refugee camps in West Timor. 
One NGO source inside Kupang has told T APOL that 
these soldiers are still receiving wages and food rations 
from the army. 
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Division in militia ranks 
The TNI-sponsored militias who still exert a menacing 
influence over the refugees are said to number 50,000 men 
who, according to reliable sources, conduct training exer-
cises daily in forty locations in West Timor. However, their 
intentions now appear to be ambiguous. Many militias, 
fearing that they are losing favour with their Indonesian 
military benefactors, have started voicing doubts regarding 
their sponsors and have expressed a wish to return to East 
Timor. The Washington Post recently reported that 'there 
are signs the Indonesian armed forces ... are moving slowly 
but deliberately to cut ties with their former proteges'. 
Such signs may have prompted the action of militia 
leader Joao da Silva Tavares who, in mid December, an-
nounced that he had officially disbanded the self-styled 
East Timorese Fighter Force (PPTT) along with various 
other militia leaders. Tavares said that armed struggle was 
no longer appropriate for the East Timorese loyal to the 
Republic of Indonesia, and political struggle was more re-
alistic. However not all of the militia leaders agreed with 
this position. Eurico Gutteres, head of the notorious Aita-
rak (Thom) militia, publicly dissociated himself from 
Tavares' proclamation. While the militia are not unified in 
their position; they are still active among the refugees. 
In a detailed report published on 20 December, Amnesty 
International stated that the human rights crisis in West 
Timor was far from over. They found that refugees were 
'often intimidated, harassed, extorted and in some cases 
subjected to unlawful killings and sexual violence by mili-
tia groups'. Refugees interviewed by Amnesty Interna-
tional who had returned to Dili from camps in the Belu 
district in West Timor in November spoke of repeated in-
cidents of rape by the militia and Indonesian soldiers. Ac-
cording to two refugees, a number of women were held in 
sexual slavery at the house of a TNI member. Refugees 
International were more forthright. In their report on 4 
January they said: 'Make no mistake, this continues to be a 
hostage situation and the international community cannot 
relax until it is assured this is no longer the case.' 
As well as their campaign of violence, the militia are 
also waging an intelligence war. One reason why so many 
refugees are still in West Timor is the lack of accurate in-
formation about the present situation in East Timor coupled 
with a systematic campaign of disinformation and rumour 
being circulated inside the camps by the militias. Refugees 
are being led to believe that a war is still raging in East 
Timor, that Interfet are killing returning refugees and that 
Australian soldiers are raping women. UNHCR efforts to 
counter these lies with their own information dissemination 
campaigns and 'go-and-see' visits have so far proved to be 
inadequate. The International Organisation of Migration 
(IOM) recently stated: 'Rumours, counter-information, 
intimidation and negative information campaigns continue 
to circulate. This is dissuading many East Timorese from 
returning.' Until this issue can be comprehensively ad-
dressed the refugee crisis will persist. 
Another pressing problem is that of health. Since the 
rainy season began in November, living conditions inside 
these makeshift refugee camps have become horrific. Ma-
laria, chronic diarrhoea and tuberculosis are claiming lives 
daily with children and babies under the age of five being 
the most vulnerable; the infant mortality rate is high. In late 
December a UNICEF nutritional survey of 850 children in 
the Belu district showed that 'almost a quarter of the chil-
dren under the age of five are malnourished' and said that 
'this alarming situation... warrants immediate remedial 
action'. The Jakarta daily, Media Indonesia, reported that 
at least 449 East Timorese had so far died of disease in 
West Timor refugee camps. This death toll can only esca-
late in the weeks and months ahead. 
The hazards for international agencies 
Official repatriation of refugees has been a long and ar-
duous task for the UNHCR and IOM. They have operated 
in a hostile environment since first trying to enter the 
camps and staff have had to risk their personal safety. Mi-
litia intimidation has not been directed solely at refugees 
but also at the aid agencies, including the United Nations. 
Although the UNHCR formally has access to all the 
c_amps, local aut?orities have been lax in providing secu-
rity. The result is that many areas, particularly the Belu 
region close to the border with East Timor, are too risky for 
the UNHCR to operate effectively. In mid-November mi-
litia thugs stopped a convoy of three UNHCR trucks from 
picking up refugees at Halewen camp near Atambua air-
port. Despite police and army reinforcements the militia 
stood their ground and forced the UNHCR to pull back as 
their vehicles were being stoned. At least 20 such incidents 
have now occurred in the Belu region alone. UNHCR staff 
~ave also ?een physically assaulted and the security situa-
tion deteriorated so much that in mid-December the 
!JNHCR acknowledged that 'West Timar is the only place 
m the world where UNHCR workers are heavily escorted 
by police and army troops when they go to the camps.' 
. Convent~~nal repatriation methods are therefore not ap-
phcable. In~tlall~ the UNHCR were unable to compile 
comprehensive hsts of those wishing to return home be-
cause compiling lists made people targets for the militia. 
As. a result? the. UNHCR ~p~ed for an extraction policy. 
This ess~nt1ally mvolved drivmg unannounced into camps 
and loa~1!1g up trucks with refugees as quickly as possible, 
then dri~mg out fast. This was not the most expedient way 
to repatriate up to 300,000 people but it demonstrates how 
desperate the situation had become even for the UN. It is 
20 TAPOL Bulletin No. 156, January/February 2000 
unbelievable that neither the Jakarta government nor the 
international community seriously addressed the issue that 
UN staff as well as East Timorese were suffering daily in-
timidation and physical violence. 
In recent weeks the security situation seems to have 
eased and UN staff are now able to enter camps where pre-
viously they had no access at all. The most worrisome is-
sue now is the problem of disinformation. For those refu-
gees who are able to leave West Timor, a boat or plane 
takes them to Dili. UNHCR in conjunction with IOM have 
been running flights and ships daily from several areas in 
West Timor but at times of very high intimidation these 
services have been cancelled because so few refugees had 
managed to register. 
Some refugees near the border have managed to leave 
camps ·unescorted. These 'spontaneous' returnees often 
walk for hours in the burning sun to cross the border on 
foot. After reaching Suai and Maliana, they have told sto-
ries of militia intimidation right up to the border. Even 
though they are being allowed through TNI-controlled bor-
der posts, militia are still robbing them of their very last 
possessions before letting them re-enter East Timor. 
The threat of re-settlement 
The Indonesian government response to these problems 
entered a new phase at the beginning of the year. They now 
consider the 'emergency' phase to be over and have started 
on a period of resettlement and rehabilitation for those 
refugees remaining. Concerted efforts are being made in 
Kupang to resettle those refugees who remain, Jakarta 
logic dictating that those who are still in Indonesia are 
there by choice. Yet it is unclear how many refugees have 
chosen to be resettled, either locally or in other parts of 
Indonesia. What is clear however, is that there are as yet no 
criteria or appropriate screening process to ascertain the 
true wishes of the refugees. It is quite possible that refu-
gees are agreeing to resettlement because the alternative of 
openly declaring that they wish to return to East Timor 
may still prove to be too dangerous. Refugees International 
has also argued that 'militia retribution against those who 
opt to go home could be swift and brutal... Unless all 
members of families who are in West Timor are inter-
viewed together, stray family members could be used by 
the militia as hostages ... these might be held indefinitely in 
West Timor or transmigrated elsewhere in Indonesia." 
Violence and health are not the only problems that these 
refugees face, there are also the associated problems of 
living in Indonesia. There is already widespread and open 
resentment of this displaced East Timorese population 
from the local population. Local communities envy the free 
aid that these East Timorese receive while they themselves 
receive nothing and are often no better off. This has al-
ready resulted in violent clashes between local and East 
Timorese youths outside of Kupang. There are also dis-
turbing reports that the TNI and militia inside the camps 
have started trading their weapons to local Kupang com-
munities and more ominously to buyers arriving from Am-
bon where inter-communal violence has already taken 
thousands of lives. It seems that the refugees have not 
solved the TNI's East Timor problem but unleashed a new 
Indonesian one. 
As the months wear on, it is becoming harder to tell 
who are the victims. TNI children are also dying of illness 
inside these camps, the militia appear to be running scared 
and are as keen as the refugees to go back to their homes in 
WESTTIMOR 
East Timor. They as well as their hostages are seeking se-
curity guarantees before they re-cross the border. Three 
months on and the struggle for East Timor may be over but 
the struggle of the East Timorese is still going on. * 
continuation from page 26 
about 'ex-TNI generals who like to incite those things. 
It has spilled over from the Malukus'. [ABC, 20 January] As 
we report elsewhere in this issue, a hard-line wing within 
the armed forces, intent on undermining Indonesia's first 
democratically elected president and seeking to divert atten-
tion from their defeat in East Timor, see the spread of vio-
lence across the archipelago as a way of showing that the 
civilians in power in Jakarta are unable and unfit to govern. 
Many commentators in Jakarta agree that the govern-
ment's failure as yet to resolve the bloodshed in Maluku has 
made it possible for these 'dark forces' to spread the 
scourge of violence to other parts of the country. On 24 
January, a mob of people attacked and destroyed a church in 
Bima on the island of Sumbawa which lies just east of Lom-
bok, raising fears that the trouble could spread further east. 
Unrest in Makassar 
There have also been serious disturbances in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi, formerly known as Ujung Pandang. Here-
too, Muslim groups have used the conflict in Maluku to hold 
demonstrations in defence of their many hundreds of co-
religionists who have lost their lives in Maluku. 
Gangs of students from the city's Hasanuddin University 
and several private universities, some of them armed with 
sharp weapons and sticks, have been stopping passers-by 
and motorists demanding to see their IDs. Non-Muslims 
were assaulted and in some cases seriously injured. 
A number of students were arrested for conducting 
'sweepings', leading to further demonstrations by students 
calling for their release. 
But these jihad-inspired activities do not have the sup-
port of all the students. Hundreds took part in a long march 
through the city to the regional assembly, criticising the 
Wahid government for failing as yet to halt the conflict in 
Maluku, and urging it to disclose the identities of the 'dark 
forces' that have masterminded the Maluku conflict. 
[Indonesian Observer, 20 January] 
Killings in East Java 
A different kind of violence re-emerged in East Java in 
December where there have been a number of macabre 
killings. The most recent to die at the hands of unknown 
assassins was a 65-year-old woman living in an isolated 
house with her blind daughter. The woman who the ninth 
victim in a series of killings in the district of Malang, was 
slashed to death and her house was destroyed by fire . • 
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Two-faced EU resumes arms sales 
A member of the Indonesian government has reacted angrily to the European Union's decision not 
to extend the four-month arms embargo imposed during last September's violence in East Timor. 
Concerned about the fragility of the new democracy and fear/ ul of a military coup, cabinet minister 
Sarwono Kusumaatmadja condemned the EU for purporting to promote reform while selling arms to 
the divided and mutinous military. 
The ban on arms sales and military co-operation was 
lifted when it expired on 17 January. An attempt by Portu-
gal, Ireland and Sweden to extend the embargo by three 
months - which would have required unanimous support -
was opposed by France, Italy, Spain and Belgium. 
Britain reportedly 'hedged its bets' thereby opposing 
continued sanctions. It is now free to continue the delivery 
of Hawk ground-attack aircraft and issue new arms export 
licences (equipment previously licensed by the present La-
bour government has included components for combat air-
craft, aircraft cannon, and military helicopters, components 
for armoured fighting vehicles and armoured personnel 
carriers, combat helmets, communications equipment and 
military simulators). 
Dissent within the EU was evident from a strident 
statement by the Dutch foreign minister, Van Aartsen, the 
day before the embargo expired, saying that he opposed the 
ending of the embargo. He said he would be urging the 
Dutch company, Hollandse Signaalapparaten (HSA), 
which is about to export radar equipment for the Indone-
sian navy from the Netherlands, to abstain from delivering 
the equipment for the time being. Van Aartsen made this 
remark on the eve of his departure to Indonesia. 
Other equipment which is about to be delivered is up to 
70 armoured personnel carriers and 18 reconnaissance ve-
hicles from France. 
There is no doubt that this is a severe blow 
to Indonesia's emerging democracy, which is 
seriously threatened by military machinations 
aimed at undermining the government of 
President Wahid. The Indonesian army has 
been criticised for stoking up the communal 
violence in Maluku archipelago by taking 
sides in the bloody clashes, which have re-
sulted in thousands of deaths, and continues to 
commit atrocities in Aceh and West Papua 
with impunity. TNI is challenging the demo-
cratically elected government by seeking to 
impose martial Jaw in several regions and has 
questioned the constitutional position of the 
head of state as supreme commander of the 
armed forces. 
Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, minister for 
maritime affairs told a British journalist of his 
discontent with the EU's decision to lift the 
d'etat. They are subverting the work of the government by 
perpetuating a controlled and limited state of unrest,' said 
Mr Sarwono in an interview with a leading British news-
paper [Independent, 18 January]. 
He accused Western countries of being 'two-faced' in 
wanting to 'pave the way to democratic development but 
also ... to make money from selling arms.' 
US maintains sanctions 
The decision to lift the embargo is all the more outra-
geous given the fact that just three days earlier the US was 
compelled to issue a stark warning to the Indonesian mili-
tary not to subvert the democratic process. Speaking to 
journalists on 14 January, the US Ambassador to the UN, 
Richard Holbrooke, made it clear that any coup attempt 
would do Indonesia immense, perhaps irreparable, damage 
and would lead to its isolation from the rest of the world. 
He also expressed grave concern about the continuing 
refugee crisis in West Timor, the blame for which he laid 
primarily at the door of the Indonesian military who con-
tinue to provide financial support and encouragement to the 
militias. He predicted increased international pressure for 
an international tribunal to try those responsible for atroci-
ties in East Timor and made it clear that US military sanc-
tions could not be lifted under present conditions. 
embargo. 'We all have a sense that elements of Demo in front of the Foreign Office in London on 20May1998, 
the army are trying to effect a creeping coup one day before the fall of Suharto. Photo: Paul Slattery 
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European Parliament and Australian in-
telligence ignored 
The embargo was lifted in defiance of the unanimous 
views of members of the European Parliament expressed in 
a resolution co-sponsored by Liberal Democrat MEP, Liz 
Lynne on 15 December. The resolution, supported by the 
European Commission, called for the embargo to be ex-
tended and warned that the resumption of arms exports 
would send a signal to the TNI that they have been reha-
bilitated and would legitimise internal repression. 
Responding to the lifting of the embargo, Ms Lynne 
said: 'Letting the embargo lapse now could be a costly 
mistake - it shows the EU does not understand the threat 
the Indonesian army poses to democracy and human 
rights.... [British foreign secretary] Robin Cook has 
shown that he is too spineless to stand up for his famous 
ethical foreign policy... This shameful decision will 
weaken, not strengthen the fragile forces of democracy in 
Indonesia ... ' 
A secret assessment by the Australian Defence Intelli-
gence Organisation in December also concluded that the 
embargo must continue since it would impact most heavily 
on the operational side of TNI and its ability to oversee 
internal repression. 
Britain's unethical foreign policy 
The position of the British Government on arms sales 
throughout the recent crises has been a disgrace. 
Britain strenuously opposed the introduction of military 
sanctions until East Timor was literally in ruins in Septem-
ber [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 154/155, p. 34] and has ig-
nored recent evidence that British-made Saladin armoured 
vehicles are being used in the Maluku clashes. At the end 
of December, Saladins were used on the streets of the pro-
vincial capital, Ambon, to fire on those involved in the 
fighting [Associated Press, 30 December]. On 26 Decem-
ber, a Christian church in central Ambon was burnt down 
while onlookers danced on top of armoured vehicles sta-
tioned nearby. This act of arson sparked renewed clashes 
and hundreds more deaths. 
On 12 January, a group of people from the Timika area 
of West Papua complained to the regional assembly of 
panic caused by troops using armoured vehicles whenever 
there is a problem in their heavily-militarised district 
[Detikcom, Jakarta, 12 January]. (Although we have no 
evidence that the vehicles being used in Timika are British, 
this report reinforces the evidence that armoured vehicles 
are being used for internal repression. The government 
claims it will not issue licences for more armoured vehi-
cles, but it has allowed the export of spare parts, which is 
equally indefensible.) 
There is increasing evidence that the so-called ethical 
dimension of British foreign policy will not be tolerated by 
the pro-arms industry Department of Trade and Industry, 
Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister's office. At 
the beginning of January, the Guardian newspaper reported 
that the secretaries of defence and trade and industry were 
pressing for an end to a freeze on arms exports to Pakistan 
imposed after the military coup in October 1999. The for-
eign secretary, Robin Cook and international development 
secretary, Clare Short, were said to be implacably opposed 
and a junior minist.er correctly predicted 'If we lose this, it 
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will be Indonesia next.. ... ... This is the filthy end of for-
eign policy.' [Guardian, 12 January] 
Later in January, Prime Minister Tony Blair was re-
ported to have overruled Robin Cook in giving the go-
ahead for the sale of spare parts to Zimbabwe for Hawk 
jets being used in the civil war in the Congo [Guardian , 20 
January]. 
There is no direct evidence that the foreign office under 
Robin Cook has opposed arms sales to Indonesia, but it has 
apparently been under intense pressure from other minis-
tries to allow the export of virtually any kind of military 
equipment. 
In October 1997, following an announcement by Robin 
Cook that he had blocked the sale to Indonesia of armoured 
vehicles and sniper rifles, the Prime Minister's office re-
portedly wrote to him telling him 'to moderate his policy of 
blocking arms sales to countries accused of serious human 
rights violations' [see TAPOL Bulletin No 144, p. 23]. 
Later, in July 1998, a letter from then defence secretary, 
George Robertson, to Robin Cook revealed the lengths to 
which the defence ministry would go to promote lethal ex-
ports. In attempting to persuade the foreign office to allow 
the export of armoured land rov rs to the disgraced General 
Prabowo, responsible for numero human rights atrocities, 
he described the general as 'an enli ened officer, keen to 
increase professionalism within the a forces and to 
educate them in areas such as human rights' [$ee TAPOL 
Bulletin No 149/ 150, p. 31]. -
Business the priority 
Reacting to the news that arms sales would be resumed 
. ' the Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, neatly 
summed up government policy when he argued that min-
isters had replaced their foreign policy with an ethical di-
mension with a 'commercial policy with a foreign dimen-
sion'. 
The commercial imperative of foreign policy was em-
phasised once again by foreign office minister, John Battle, 
in a speech to the British Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta 
on 18 January when he explained that Britain wants to 
'underpin not undermine' the efforts of President Wahid 
because of 'Indonesia's strategic importance, its potential 
as a huge market, and because we have long-standing and 
extensive interests here already'. 
The affirmation of the need to 'underpin not undermine' 
the new government is a convenient, but hypocritical 
soundbite now being used by ministers, who are doing ex-
actly the opposite by allowing the export of arms to the 
self-serving armed forces engaged in fomenting instability 
in order to retain their grip on power. Ministerial obfusca-
tion which implies that the Indonesian government and 
military are working together to underpin democracy and 
that sanctions against the military will undermine the gov-
ernment is reprehensible. 
The foreign office must now take a principled stand 
against business-oriented ministries in order to clean up the 
'filthy end of foreign policy' and insist on unilateral sanc-
tions against the Indonesian military without delay. * 
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Investigating the 1965/1966 massacre 
Former political prisoner Sulami who served a 20-year sentence and was released in 1984 has taken 
the lead in investigating the massacres that killed up to a million people as Suharto seized power in 
late 1965. Since her release, Sulami has devoted her life to this work. Earlier this year, she and 
other former political prisoners set up the Indonesian Institute/or the Study of the 196511966 Mas-
sacre. She spoke to Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL during a visit to Amsterdam in December. 
When I left you behind in Bukit Duri prison in 1971, 
you were still being held there. But you were released 
from Tangerang Prison. When did they move you 
there? 
I was transferred to Tanggerang Prison in 1981 when 
my 20-year court verdict was finally confirmed, after the 
appeals procedures had been completed. From then on, I 
became a 'convicted prisoner' or napol, no longer a tapol. 
Tanggerang prison was .a women's prison run by the civil-
ian authorities. I was held there for three years until my 
release in 1984. 
My recollection of you in Bukit Duri is of being able 
to get your hands on newspapers and other things we 
were never allowed to have. How did you do it? 
It was with the help of the criminal prisoners who were 
held in the other half of the prison. They used to smuggle in 
pencils and paper in the evenings so that I could do some 
writing after the cells were locked up. But early in the 
morning, they would take them back and hide them in case 
my cell was searched. This was how I was able to keep my 
brain occupied. During my time at Bukit Duri, I wrote a 
novel, a novella, a collection of short stories and some po-
ems. As you know, since my release, I have written my 
memoirs about how I was arrested, my trial and my experi-
ences in prison. The memoirs have just been published. 
Where did you stay after your release? How long 
was it before you were re-united with your family? 
First of all, up until August 1986, I was required to re-
port monthly to the public prosecutor's office. It would have 
been very difficult for me to go back home to Sragen be-
cause of all the formalities I would have had to go through 
to travel to Central Java and the level of control there was 
very tight. Things were still extremely difficult for ex-
pnsoners. 
I accepted an offer from the mother of the prison director 
who ran a canteen at a factory in T anggerang to go and 
work at the canteen. At least I was safe there as her husband 
was a member of the military police which gave me a kind 
of protection. I lived at the factory for four and a half years 
and helped to hand out the food at mealtimes. I was paid a 
small wage for this. My sister found a place to live in Tang-
gerang while I was there. 
My brother who lived in Sragen had been sacked from 
his government job in 1966 because he had rented out part 
of his house to the local branches of the women's organisa-
tion, Gerwani and the peasants' union, BTI. They even de-
tained him for three months because of this. So with this 
background, he too was under a cloud and my presence 
would only have made things more difficult! 
When did you start making contact with your for-
mer Gerwani comrades? 
While I was working at the canteen, Saskia Wierenga, a 
Dutch feminist doing research into the history of Gerwani, 
came to see me. She interviewed me and helped me to make 
contact with my former colleagues in the regions. 
When the security situation for former prisoners began to 
improve, I left the factory and went to live with my sister. 
Sulami in Amsterdam 
When did you start with your investigations? 
All the time I was in prison, I was obsessed with the idea 
of investig.a~~g what happened in 1965. With Saskia's help, 
I started VlSltmg s~me regions and making contact with peo-
ple who had e~penenced the massacres, who had seen things 
or whose relatives had been killed. People were prepared to 
talk to me, they trusted me because I was from Gerwani. I 
heard some terrible testimonies. 
. In 1994, I went to the provinces and talked to the fami-
lies of a lot of the victims, a lot of the wives especially. 
They were often still waiting for their husbands to come 
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back. A lot of them have never remarried since that time and 
they are very anxious to know what happened to their hus-
bands., are they still alive, are they in jail or were they 
killed? If they were killed, who killed them and where are 
they buried? This sort of knowledge is very important to 
them. 
During my investigations, I heard of one man who had 
been the head teacher at a village school. He had been given 
the so-called 'hukum picis ' punishment. This is a penalty 
dating back to the days when feudal society was still very 
strong. He was stripped naked and paraded round the vil-
lage. Villagers were told that they could slice off bits of his 
body, chop off his hands or limbs, cut off his ears. Some 
people joined in because of the deep animosity towards 
members of the banned organisations; others refused to join 
in. This poor man fainted as he was being dragged round the 
village and mauled and later died. 
I had heard about this terrible penalty so I went to a vil-
lage where it had happened and indeed found people, his 
neighbours as no members of his family could be found, 
who were prepared to testify. 
I also met Indonesianists who interviewed me, including 
Anton Lucas from Adelaide University who published the 
interview though he didn't use my proper name. Another 
person I met was Saraswati from the University of Wash-
ington who offered to help with my research and gave me 
some assistance. 
After I had been able to contact former tapols who 
wanted to get involved in collecting testimonies about the 
1965/1966 massacres, I was contacted by an Australian TV 
documentary journalist who asked me to help him with a 
film about this to be screened in September 1998. 
He interviewed me with friends in Central Java as we 
were excavating places where people murdered in 1965 
were buried. He also took me to the Pancasila Monument in 
Lubang Buaya with frescoes depicting the horrible things 
members of Gerwani are alleged to have done there to the 
bodies of the generals murdered on 1 October 1965 . I told 
him the stories were a grotesque distortion. It's terrible that 
that monument is still standing. It ought to be destroyed. 
I saw that film, 'The Killing Fields of Indonesia', 
shown on SBS, Australia and l was greatly inspired by 
your courage and tenacity. 
Honestly, I never realised that it would be such a major 
film. He only had a tiny camera. We have had private 
showings of the film in many places in Indonesia. It's been 
very helpful to our work. 
There's been a lot of interest from the media as well. 
After it appeared, I was interviewed at least twice a day. I 
gave altogether 48 interviews. 
Some of our friends from the PKI (the Communist Party) 
were not happy about all this because they were afraid we 
were making ourselves too conspicuous. But they've stopped 
saying this. 
When did you decide to set up your Institute? 
I went to see Pramoedya Ananta Toer to talk about our 
work. He has always been very enthusiastic but he advised 
me that it was much too much for one person to handled and 
suggested that we set up an organisation. We set ourselves 
up on 15 April 1999. I had to borrow money to pay for the 
notary's act. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
We have now quite an extensive network of groups in 
many parts of the country, in Bali, Sumatra, and South Su-
lawesi as well as in Central and East Java, investigating the 
killings in their our localities. 
When I came to Amsterdam to attend the conference on 
'Against Impunity ', my friends held a seminar in Semarang 
to discuss our methodology and establish guidelines. That 
will be very important. 
Some people say that all this happened 35 years ago, 
to investigate it only brings up bad memories and cre-
ates more conflict in society, that it's better to let these 
matters rest and try to forget that terrible time in In-
donesia's past. What do you say to people who argue 
that way? 
We are determined not to rake things over but the fact 
remains that so many people were killed and the people 
responsible must be made accountable. It's very easy for 
people who have not suffered a loss to say these matters 
should be left alone. But people who suffered the loss of 
loved ones are continually having nightmares and worrying 
about what happened. So I think it's important for them 
that this matter is continually talked about. There needs to 
be a lesson for people also. The killing of just one person is 
a crime, so how much more terrible is it when more than 
one person is killed. The murder of hundreds of thousands 
of people must be talked about and accounted for. 
It' s like a struggle for civilisation to make sure that 
things like this will not happen in future. There's been a lot 
of enthusiasm, we've been getting a lot of support in the 
provinces and receiving lot of reports from people who've 
been gathering information. Our main aim is to make peo-
ple responsible for what happened and if necessary, to 
bring them to trial before an international court of justice. 
In discussion about investigations into former President 
Suharto, this issue has been touched on but those responsi-
ble have said that their job is to deal with corruption, collu-
sion and nepotism and they say it would be unethical for 
them to deal with other matters or delve into the killings of 
1965. 
Have you been able to interest the National Commis-
sion on Human Rights in your work? 
We had a meeting with the chair, Marzuki Darusman, 
who told us the massacres happened too long ago, long be-
fore the Commission was set up. But he asked us to submit 
our report and they will decide how to follow it up. 
I was happy to meet Hasballah Saad, the Minister for 
Human Rights here at the conference in Amsterdam. He 
asked me to come and see him when. I return to Jakarta. 
Thank you, Sulami, for everything you are doing. I 
hope that it will be an inspiration to the younger genera-
tion and encourage them to take your work forward. 
Source: Some sections of this interview are from an interview 
of Sulami by Peter Mares and broadcast on Radio News First 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation) on 9 July 1999. 
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SOCIAL UNREST 
Violence spreads to Lombok 
As the inter-communal conflict in M aluku entered its second year, violence spread to the island of 
Lombok. Many churches were torched and most of the tiny Christian community, many of them 
Chinese, fled to nearby Bali. Tourists also left the island hastily as foreign embassies in Jakarta is-
sued travel advisories against visiting Lombok and other parts of Indonesia. 
The sudden flare-up in Mataram, the capital of 
Lombok, took everyone by surprise though the 
chances of trouble erupting somewhere had in-
creased following the mass rally in Jakarta on 7 
January at which some of those present raised the 
jihad cry. 
Lombok island is part of the string of islands 
known as West and East Nusatenggara stretching 
eastwards from Bali and reaching down to now 
independent East Timor. Some five years ago, 
Lombok became the focus for a new tourist centre 
around the island's capital Mataram, to relieve the 
pressure on Bali. Hotels and restaurants were built 
in the capital and nearby Senggigi became a new 
attraction for tourists seeking idyllic, 'unspoilt' 
beaches and a holiday away from it all. Within a 
short space of time, it had become one of the most 
promising tourist destinations in South East Asia. Destruction in Lombok 
While Muslims comprise the largest religious 
group in Lombok, there are many Hindus (which is the main 
religion in Bali) as well as a number of traditional commu-
nities who have retained their own animist beliefs. The more 
eastern islands of Nusatenggara, especially the island of 
Flores, are mainly Catholic. 
Homes and tourist facilities wrecked 
The violence exploded on the morning of 1 7 January as 
thousands who had been attending a rally in Mataram, the 
capital city, to protest against the killing of Muslims in Ma-
luku were dispersing. However, reports from local people 
and tourists who witnessed the outburst all confirm that the 
gangs responsible for the violence had been trucked in, with 
supplies of petrol, in an orchestrated attack which was timed 
to coincide with the end of the rally. According to one wit-
ness: 'A truck would stop, like a cattle truck. They'd all get 
off the back ... they'd pour petrol on the road, set it alight, 
stand back, throw bottles full of petrol . . . which would then 
explode.' [Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January] Others say 
that the gangs were carrying documents listing Christian and 
Chinese premises to be attacked. [Independent on Sunday, 
23 January] 
The mayhem continued for three days with the rioters 
showing little regard for the army's shoot-on-sight warning. 
Gangs roamed the streets checking houses in their search for 
Christian families and looting and burning all those that 
could be identified as such. Ten or more churches were gut-
ted and scores of houses, shops and offices were razed or 
vandalised. In Senggigi, restaurants were gutted but the five-
star hotels were left unscathed. However, they were deserted 
by the guests and after the violence died down, were barri-
caded behind military guard 
In Mataram, the police, expecting trouble, had placed 
small teams of men in front of churches while the rally was 
in progress but they fled for their own safety because the 
violence spread so fast. [Kompas, 18 January] 
Loss of life appears to have been low; five of the rioters 
died, apparently shot by troops trying to restore order. There 
were no reports of Christians fighting back; their only re-
sponse was to get out, and fast. Hundreds of Christian fami-
lies sought sanctuary in Bali while most tourists in the area 
also fled. 
Dainage to property has been estimated at 60bn rupiah 
(£5 . 7m). But the longterm economic damage could be far 
greater as Indonesia's burgeoning tourist industry sustains a 
serious setback to its reputation 
News of the sudden eruption of violence in Lombok was 
widely reported worldwide. The violence reverberated even 
more than the inter-communal clashes that have wracked 
Maluku for twelve months. 
'Dark forces' blamed 
Leaders of the local Christian community in Lombok see 
the t:fil~e-day violen~ as being the price people have to pay, 
as victims of the pohtlcal power play in Jakarta. This view 
is confirmed by commentators in Jakarta and by President 
Wahid himself. In an interview with the ABC, he spoke 
continued on page 21 
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Political exiles invited to return home 
H un~reds of Indonesians livin.g in political exile since 1965 have now been invited to return home by 
President Abdurrahman Wahid. The new government has also released all remaining political pris-
oners. But d? the~e measures end once ?nd for all the discriminatory practices which the present 
government inherttedfrom the Suharto dictatorship? 
The announcement by President Wahid earlier this year 
that all political exiles now living in many parts of the 
world can come home without facing any obstacles came 
as a great relief to the hundreds of people who have been 
~arced since 1965 to build new lives in foreign lands. They 
mclude people of many backgrounds and political persua-
sions who were overseas - in Europe, the Soviet Union 
China - in October 1965 and who found themselves bein~ 
branded as members of the Indonesian Communist Party, 
the PKI and therefore liable to immediate arrest if they 
dared return home. 
They include well-known members of the PKI as well 
as people who were in eastern European countries to study 
and Indonesian ambassadors who were suspected of pro-
Sukarno sentiments 
Meeting in The Hague 
Wahid dispatched his minister of law and legislation, 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra to the Netherlands where the vast 
majority of the exiles now live. Several hundred exiles at-
tended an emotional meeting at the Indonesian embassy in 
The Hague, at which many of those present, some of them 
in wheelchairs, spoke of the difficulties they have lived 
through as a result of the harsh persecution during the Su-
harto regime. The policy led to estrangement with their 
families at home, many of whom avoided contact with par-
ents or siblings overseas for fear of arousing the suspicions 
of army intelligence. They were all forced to abandon their 
Indonesian citizenship and become foreign nationals. 
It is ironic that the cabinet minister charged to bring the 
good news to such an audience now chairs Partai Bulan 
Bintang, the Muslim party which is the successor of 
Masyumi, banned in 1960 by Sukarno with the support of 
the PKI. Yusril told the meeting that the government is 
preparing legislation to enable them to be reinstated as In-
donesian citizens without having to go through the process 
of naturalisation. · 
But he cautioned the audience against raising the issue 
of the 1966 MPR (supreme legislative assembly) decree 
which banned the teachings of Marxism and Leninism and 
which is still in force. He said that this was a matter for the 
MPR and the government has no power to revoke it. 
[Kompa$, 20 January] 
The point was driven home when his own party fraction 
in parliament, the DPR, declared its opposition to the gov-
emment' s decision to invite these political exiles to return. 
The PBB argues that they should only be allowed home 
after declaring their rejection of Marxist teachings. The 
PBB will strongly resist any move to have the 1966 MPR 
decree lifted, Soemargono said. [Kom as, 26 Januan:] 
~-
Francisco Branco (right) hack in Dili. He belongs to the 
last group of released Timorese prisoners. Together with 
Liem Soei Liongfrom TAPOL. 
Dealing with 1965 
While it is highly unlikely that the PBB view will per-
suade President Wahid to reconsider his decision, the dis-
pute highlights the failure as yet for civil society in Indone-
sia to deal comprehensively with the events of 1965 that 
brought General Suharto to power. 
'The question of the 1960s is very crucial for Indonesia 
as a nation, not just for the particular victims,' said Ariel 
Heryanto, who lectures in political science at the National 
University in Singapore. 'We have not really dealt with the 
1960s, neither morally, ethically nor intellectually.' [Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 30 December 1999] 
While many seminars have been held in Indonesia to 
discuss re-writing contemporary Indonesian history, it is 
true that many of those now in positions of political influ-
ence, as well as the Indonesian armed forces, continue to 
pursue the anti-communist line embedded in the Indone-
sian psyche during the New Order, and fail to understand 
that the Cold War is over. 
All political prisoners released 
Following the election of President Wahid in Octo-
ber 1999, there have been two waves of releases of politi-
continued on page 4 
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WEST PAPUA 
Irian Jaya becomes Papua 
Support for independence from Indonesia has continued to find expression in innumerable flag-
raising ceremonies in West Papua. The country's new president thought he could curb these aspira-
tions by renaming the province Papua. Meanwhile, the strongest opposition to Indonesian rule is 
centred in Timika where scores of people were injured when troops opened fire to end a weeks-long 
flag-raising event. 
On 31 December 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid 
made a highly publicised visit to West Papua to see in the 
New Year and the Millennium, though he chose the head-
quarters of the regional military command as the venue at 
which to celebrate. He used the occasion to announce that 
the much-hated name of the province, Irian Jaya, would be 
changed to Papua. 
But when tribal leader Ondofolo Theys Eluay said, 'We 
want to build a new Papua,' Wahid' s response was cate-
gorical: 'I guarantee freedom of expression so I accept 
(your) demand for independence as freedom of expression, 
but I won't tolerate any efforts to establish a country within 
a country.' [South China Morning Post, 3 January] 
Whatever the president may have said, it was announced 
a few weeks later that a group of six West Papuan including 
Theys Eluay, were to go on trial, facing charges of sedition 
for having orchestrated a number of flag-raising events in 
July 1998. They face a maximum penalty of 15 years . The 
other five are Don Flassy, secretary of the provincial plan-
ning board, Drs Laurens Mehue, Sem Y aru, the Rev. 
Agustinus Ansanay and Barnabus Yufuway. 
Troops fire on flag-raisers in Timika 
The West Papua flag, Kejora or Morning Star has been 
raised in virtually all the main towns across the territory but 
nowhere with greater commitment than in Timika where 
people have been campaigning for years to rid their region 
of the copper-and-gold mine, Freeport/Ri.o Tinto which un-
lawfully seized tribal lands and has caused widespread pol-
lution and damage. 
Although elsewhere, 1 December was chosen as the day 
to unfurl the flag, commemorating the day in 1961 when 
West Papuans proclaimed an independent state while still 
under Dutch colonial rule, in Timika the flag was raised 
outside a Catholic church on 12 November and kept aloft 
for weeks. Hundreds of heavily-armed police who moved in 
to pull down the flag on 2 December were confronted by a 
huge crowd of around three thousand. After firing warning 
shots, the police open fire on the crowd, leaving fifty-five 
people injured, some of them seriously. According to some 
reports which we have been unable to verify, some of flag-
raisers were killed in the attack. 
Three people were taken into custody, including Mama 
Y osepha Alomang, renowned for her protracted struggle 
against Freeport/Ri.o Tinto. She and her two male colleagues 
were released when the huge crowd refused to disperse until 
they were freed. 
Flag-raisings elsewhere on 1 December, in Manokwari, 
Yapen Waropen, Nabire, Sarong, Merauke, Fakfak, Biak, 
Jayawijaya and Sentani, passed off peacefully. More re-
cently, flags have been raised again in Sarong, Depapre 
(Jayapura regency) and Wamena. In all cases, many hun-
dreds of people present and the intention appears to be to 
keep the flags aloft until I May. 
Calls for copper mine to close 
In mid January, a delegation of thirty-one people from 
the Timika area arrived in the provincial capital to lodge a 
demand for the copper-and-gold mine in their midst to be 
closed down and for the withdrawal of all army and police 
forces from the area. Led by Isak Ondowame and Mama 
Y osefa, the group met members of the regional assembly to 
complain of persistent human rights abuses committed in 
order to protect the mine. 
'There are many cases of human rights violations that go 
unreported and unsettled. Many people do not know of the 
abuse we have been suffering. We have come to the conclu-
sion that as long as the company continues its exploitation, 
more Papuans will fall prey to rights abuses,' said Isak. 
[Jakarta Post, 18 January] • 
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